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THE KOREAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 
The Kukhoe o r  t h e  National Assembly i s  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch of 
t he  government, prescr ibed  by t h e  Cons t i tu t ion  t o  represent  t h e  w i l l  of 
t he  people. In  t h i s  overview we w i l l  s t r e s s  t h e  importance of the  cul- 
t u r a l  environment i n  which the  l e g i s l a t u r e  funct ions.  Also, we w i l l  t r y  
t o  h ighl ight  t he  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  of t he  National Assembly i n  terms of i ts  
organiza t ional  s t r u c t u r e  and i t s  dynamic processes.  The chapter  comprises 
four  main topics :  (1) t he  s ign i f i cance  of t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  democracy, 
(2) t h e  na tu re  of the Korean p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re ,  (3) t h e  formal organiza- 
t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  and f i n a l l y ,  (4) t he  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
process.  
LEGISLATURE AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY 
The i n s t i t u t i o n  of popular representa t ion ,  known va r ious ly  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  na t ions  as parliament,  congress,  d i e t ,  o r  n a t i o n a l  assembly, 
has developed i n  c l o s e  a s soc ia t ion  wi th  the  r i s e  of modern democracies. 
Indeed, the meshing of t he  two has h i s t o r i c a l l y  been so  c l o s e  t h a t  one 
cannot th ink  today of a funct ioning democracy without assuming a s t rong  
and e f f e c t i v e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  A s t rong  and a c t i v e  r ep resen ta t ive  assembly, 
- one can the re fo re  a s s e r t ,  is t h e  r e q u i s i t e  of a democratic government. 
A s  a popularly e l ec t ed  body t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  performs the  l inkage funct ions  
most v i t a l  t o  the  opera t ion  of democratic p o l i t i c s .  Aspects of t h e  l inkage 
func t ions  t h a t  a r e  c e n t r a l l y  important a re :  representa t ion ,  leadersh ip  
responsiveness and accountabi l i ty ,  p o l i t i c a l  communication, leadersh ip  
se lec t ion ,  and c i t i z e n  p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i c ipa t ion .  
The f i r s t  and foremost l inkage funation commonly a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  w 
l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  representa t ion .  The concept of representa t ion  is complex 
and resists an easy de f in i t ion .  Hannah P i t k i n  has defined it a s  t h e  s t a t e  
of a f f a i r s  i n  wfiichl'the people of a na t ion  a r e  present  i n  the ac t ion  of 
its government."1 Although t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  not  t h e  only i n s t i t u t i o n  
t h a t  makes the  people's presence f e l t  i n  the  government's ac t ions ;  t h e r e  
is no quest ion t h a t  i t  i s  the  p r inc ipa l  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  l i n k s  the  w i l l  of 
the  people t o  the  nerve cen te r s  of government. The d ive r se  i n t e r e s t s  and 
opinions of hroad segments of the  population f i n d  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  e x p r e s ~  
s ions  through the  rep resen ta t ive  assmdly .  Representation is, needless t o  
say, t h e  hea r t  of a parliaslentary democracy. 
Among a l l  groups of p o l i t i c a l  leadership,  l e g i s l a t o r s  a r e  probably 
most vulnerable t o  c i t i z e n s '  control .  This is not  only because they a r e  
popularly e lec ted  but a l s o  because t h e i r  continued tenure  i n  o f f i c e  de- 
pends on a per iodic  approval hy t h e i r  cons t i tu ten t s .  No other  leadership  
groups have such incent ives  t o  he responsive t o  t h e  publ ic  a s  have t h e  
l e g i s l a t o r s .  Cabinet members, high ranking c i v i l  servants ,  m i l i t a r y  
leaders ,  judges, and managers of publ ic  corporat ions a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  im- 
mune t o  the  publ ic ' s  demands f o r  responsiveness. This is not  t o  say t h a t  
l e g i s l a t o r s  a r e  always more responsive i n  t h e i r  ac t ions  than o the r  groups, 
but r a t h e r  t h a t  they opera te  i n  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  environment i n  which 
the re  a r e  hu i l t - in  incent ives  f o r  being responsive. The extent  t o  which 
c i t i z e n s  a c t u a l l y  exe rc i se  con t ro l  over t h e i r  representa t ives  depends on 
many condit ions o the r  than t h e  mere exis tence  of a l e g i s l a t i v e  body: a 
r e l a t i v e l y  f r e e  and open e lec t ion ,  a genuine competitive pa r ty  system 
t h a t  produces a meaningful choice of candidates and p o l i c i e s ,  and most 
importantly, a p o l i t i c a l l y  sophis t ica ted  e l e c t o r a t e  who s c r u t i n i z e s  t h e  
performance of t h e i r  l e g i s l a t o r s .  
P o l i t i c a l  conmrunication is v i t a l  t a  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  opexation of any 
p o l i t i c a l  system. I n  a democracy it is  even more v i t a l .  The l e g i s l a t u r e  
a s  a l inkage i n s t i t u t i o n  p lays  a major r o l e  i n  communication. Legisla- . 
t o r s  t ransmit  the  srajor concerns of t h e i r  cons t i tuen t s  t o  t h e  government. 
Also, they inform t h e  people of the  i n t e n t s  of govermnent p o l i c i e s .  They 
a c t ,  therefore ,  as a t ransmission b e l t  of both upward and downward p o l i t -  
i c a l  communication. Moreover, t he  l e g i s l a t i v e  arena serves  as an important 
publ ic  forum where the  pressing i s sues  of t h e  day a r e  openly debated. 
Pulilic hearings and inves tzgat ions  organized by l e g i s l a t i v e  committees 
help focus pub l i c  opinions on the  issues t h a t  would otherwise remain 
dormant. I n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  regimes the  communication r o l e  of the  l e g i s -  
l a t u r e  becomes w e n  more s i g n i f i c a n t ,  not  so much because i t  is  a s t rong 
and a c t i v e  body hut  because no v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  channels of communication 
a r e  r ead i ly  avai lable .  Mass media and p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  the  two p o t e n t i a l l y  
important communications channels, tend t o  be ine f fec tua l .  With but a few 
exceptions, t he  mass media a r e  t i g h t l y  cont ro l led  by these  regimes and a r e  
permitted t o  funct ion  a s  no more than an o f f i c i a l  mouthpiece, Seldom do 
t h e  opinions and sent iments  of the people f i n d  t h e i r  f r e e  expressions i n  
the  media. Likewise, p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a r e  weak, lacking i n  mass organi- 
za t ions  and mass followings. Most of these pax t i e s  a r e  i n  e f f e c t  p a r l i a -  
mentary pax t i e s  i n  charac ter  w i t h  l i t t l e  ox no e f f e c t i v e  penet ra t ion  i n t o  
t h e  ranks of c i t i z e n s .  Thus, one cannot eJrpect of the  p a r t i e s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
communication ro le .  I n  the  absence of a l t e r n a t i v e  channels, the l e g i s l a t u r e  
emerges a s  a  f o c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  on which converge t h e  mounting pressures  
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of upward communication from t h e  people t o  t h e i r  government. 
The l e g i s l a t u r e  l i n k s  t h e  people with t h e i r  government by c rea t ing  r 
a regu la r  opportunity i n  which they can choose t h e i r  own representa t ives .  
The popular s e l e c t i o n  of leadership is an important f e a t u r e  of democracy 
and the  l e g i s l a t u r e  plays a major r o l e  i n  i t .  Moreover, the l e g i s l a t i v e  
members whom the  people choose c o n s t i t u t e  a  p r i n c i p a l  recrui tment  pool 
from which the highest  executive l eaders  a r e  o f t en  se lec ted .  Thus, not  
only do the  people have a d i r e c t  r o l e  i n  se lec t ing  t h e i r  l e g i s l a t i v e  
members but a l s o  an i n d i r e c t  ro le .  i n  the  s e l e c t i o n  of the  highest  p o l i t -  
i c a l  l eader s  of t h e  t h e  na t ion  through. t h e  operat ion of an e f f e c t i v e  
l e g i s l a t u r e  . 
The l e g i s l a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  help c r e a t e  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  oppor tuni t ies ,  
both formal and informal, t h a t  would not  otherwise be poss ib le .  It a f fo rds  
t h e  people a  formal and regular  opportunity t o  exe rc i se  t h e i r  vot ing  r i g h t s .  
But more important than t h i s  formal opportunity a r e  the  informal opportun- 
i t ies of c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  crea ted  hy t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  The a c t s  of 
lobbying a l e g i s l a t i v e  member, campaigning f o r  a  candidate, demanding con- 
s t i tuency  se rv ices ,  and taking an a c t i v e  membership i n  a  p o l i t i c a l  organi- 
za t ion  a r e  some examples of such pa r t i c ipa t ion .  These forms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  
which usua l ly  r equ i re  a  g r e a t e r  degree of commitment and p o l i t i c a l  sophis- 
t i c a t i o n  than does t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  simple a c t  of vot ing ,  a r e  the re fo re  
s t ronger  and more e f f e c t i v e  pa r t i c ipa to ry  hehaviors. A s t rong and a c t i v e  
l e g i s l a t u r e  produces a p o l i t i c a l  mi l ieu  i n  which such forms of c i t i z e n  9 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a r e  encouraged. 
.- 
The in t imate  connection between an e f f e c t i v e  l e g i s l a t u r e  and p o l i t i c a l  
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democracy is se l f -ev ident  a s  discussed above. The a r c h i t e c t s  of t h e  1948 
Korean Cons t i tu t ion  manifested t h e i r  democratic a s p i r a t i o n  hy making t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  branch a c e n t r a l  and powerful body. The scope of i ts  powers 
was extremely broad and encompassing. I n  add i t ion  t o  t h e  usua l  power of 
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h e  National  Assemhly (-Kukhoe) had the  powers t o  conduct in- 
v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s ,  and publ ic  hearings;  t h e  power t o  i n s t i t u t e  
impeachment hear ings  aga ins t  any publ ic  o f f i c i a l s  including t h e  Pres ident ;  
t h e  power f o r  advice and consent on m a t t e r s  of appointment t o  key gwernment 
p o s t s  and t h e  conduct of fo re ign  pol icy ;  and most important ly,  t h e  power 
t o  e l e c t  t h e  Executive head of t h e  nat ion.  I n  s p i t e  of a l l  t h e s e  powers 
t h a t  would have made t h e  National  Assembly t h e  s i n g l e  most important gw-. 
ernmental body, l a t e r  developments proved t o  be t o  t h e  cont rary ,  The 
National  Assembly became subsequently a weak i n s t i t u t i o n ,  dominated and 
manipulated by ambitious Pres idents .  Contrary t o  t h e  i n t e n t  of t h e  Con- 
s t i t u t i o n ,  i t  became subserv ient  t o  t h e  Executive, wi th  i t s  s t a t u s  de ter -  
i o r a t i n g  t o  t h e  poin t  of being a mere rubber-stamp organiza t ion ,  The 
quest ion is then: Why d id  it occur that way? It i s  too easy t o  seek an 
answer i n  t h e  emergence of a s t rong Executive. I n  t h e  postwar period the 
Executive has  always dominated Korean p o l i t i c s ,  poss ib ly  with t h e  exception 
of a b r i e f  period of t h e  Chang M ~ %  regime. But t o  a t t r i b u t e  t h e  impotence 
of t h e  Kukhoe t o  t h e  dominant Executive does no t  r e a l l y  provide an answer 
because a s t rong  executive and a weak l e g i s l a t u r e  a r e  two d i f f e r e n t  s i d e s  
of t h e  same phenomenon. Therefore, one must go heyond t h e  mere suggest ion 
of executive supremacy i n  order  t o  expla in  a weak l e g i s l a t u r e .  The ques t ion  
is  then: What i s  t h e r e  i n  t h e  Korean s o c i e t y  t h a t  has caused t h e  phenomenon 
of execut ive  dominance? The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of s o c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  f o r c e s  
t h a t  tend t o  concent ra te  t h e  power i n  t h e  execut ive  becomes c r u c i a l  i n  our  
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inqui ry .  
The a c t u a l  ope ra t ion  of any p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  @ 
of a complex i n t e r p l a y  of an i n s . t i t u t i o n ' s  formal s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  p o l i t -  
i c a l  c u l t u r e  t h a t  surrounds it. It is our  content ion  t h a t  t h e  National  
Assmhly,  d e s p i t e  a l l  i t s  formal powers p re sc r ibed  i n  t h e  Cons t i t u t ion ,  
has  f a i l e d  t o  become a s t rong  body hecause t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  
Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  t h a t  a r e  adverse  t o  t h e  development of a p a r l i a -  
mentary democracy. U n t i l  t h e s e  adverse c u l t u r a l  elements a r e  removed, 
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n s t i t u t i n g  a s t rong  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  assembly is sl im,  
indeed. We w i l l ,  thus ,  begin t h i s  overview wi th  a gene ra l  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
of t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  cu l ture .  This  w i l l  he lp  us  t o  understand no t  only 
t h e  subserv ien t  r o l e  t h a t  t h e  National  Assembly has  come t o  p l ay  i n  Korean 
p o l i t i c s ,  o r  i n  t h e  popular par lance  Kukhoe siny&wa (becoming a maid- 
s e rvan t  of t h e  execut ive) ,  but  a l s o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  ways i n  which the  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a f f a i r s  a r e  conducted, 2 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE 
The p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  may be defined a s  t he  p a t t e r n s  of p o l i t i c a l l y  
r e l w a n t  o r i e n t a t i o n s  shared widely among members of a s o c i e t y ,  It com- 
p r i s e s  two main p a r t s :  t h e  e l i t e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  and t h e  mass p o l i t i c a l  
cu l tu re .  Also, t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  key demensions of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  
t h a t  may se rye  a s  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of desc r ip t ion :  t h e  b e l i e f s  and a t t i t u d e s  
regarding t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system, t h e  regime and i t s  l eade r s ,  t h e  leg i t imacy 
of t h e  regime's fundamental goa ls ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e s  of l e a d e r s  and f o l -  
lowers,  and t h e  b a s i c  norms and procedures governing t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process.  
Although the  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  is  embedded i n  ind iv idua l  o r i e n t a t i o n s ,  
i t  is  no t  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  l a t t e r .  The p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re ,  whether of t h e  
e l i t e s  o r  masses, c o n s i s t s  of t he  p a t t e r n s  of p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s  and a t t i -  
tudes as d i s t r i b u t e d  throughout t h e  soc ie ty .  These p a t t e r n s  of dis trhbu- 
t i o n  and t h e i r  i s o l a t i o n  a r e  t h e  core  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  study. 
What a r e  the  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e ?  
How do these  c u l t u r a l  f e a t u r e s  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  t h e  formal p o l i t i c a l  s t ruc -  
t u r e s  and shape t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process i n  soc ie ty?  We w i l l  i s o l a t e  e i g h t  
such f e a t u r e s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re .  
A Strong Sense of National  Hdentity. One dominant f e a t u r e  of t h e  Korean 
p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  i s  its s t rong sense  of n a t i o n a l  i d e n t i t y .  V i r t u a l l y  
everyone perce ives  himself a s  a  Korean, sharp ly  d i s t ingu i sh ing  himself 
from t h e  peoples of o the r  na t ions .  I n  t h i s  r e spec t ,  Koreans are very 
much l i k e  t h e  Japanese but  s tand  in marked c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  peoples of 
many Third World coun t r i e s  where e t h n i c  and c u l t u r a l  p lura l i sm have 
made i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c r e a t e  a  common psychological  i d e n t i t y .  The homo- 
genei ty  i n  h i s to ry ,  c u l t u r e ,  and r a c e  obviously has cont r ibuted  t o  t h e  
development of a  common n a t i o n a l  i den i ty .  The phys ica l  endowments of 
Korea such a s  her  r e l a t i v e l y  compact and w e l l  def ined t e r r i t o r y  must 
have been a  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r ,  too. 
The sense  of belonging together ,  growing out  of a common n a t i o n a l  
i d e n t i t y ,  heightens n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f ee l ing .  Among a l l  p o l i t i c a l  ideologies  
t h a t  were brought t o  Korea i n  t h e  postwar period, none proved t o  have 
g r e a t e r  popular appeal  than nat ional ism. The reason i s  t h a t  t h e  ideology 
of nat ional ism and t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  a r e  compatible. Other 
ideologies of democracy and social ism had m e t  a s t rong res i s t ance ,  making 
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it d i f f i c u l t  t o  successful ly t ransplant  them i n  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  forms. 
Invariably,  these  ideologies have undergone d r a s t i c  changes, acquir ing a 6 
heavy n a t i o n a l i s t i c  component. The social ism of North Korea is  in tense ly  
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  i n  i ts  content a s  expressed i n  the  so-called Juch'e ideology 
of Kim 11-s;ng. The yushin ideology of t h e  South contains a s  much nation- 
a l i s t i c  out look a s  i t s  northern counterpart.  Nationalism i n s p i r e s  and 
arouses the  Korean mass because it s t r i k e s  a responsive chord i n  t h e i r  
sense of na t iona l  iden t i ty .  
The s t rong sense of a common na t iona l  i d e n t i t y  implies a high degree 
of consensus on t h e  legitimacy of the  Korean na t iona l  community. No one 
can se r ious ly  challenge t h e  v a l i d i t y  and legi t imacy of a Korean nat ion.  
The people a r e  in tense ly  loya l  t o  t h e  na t ion  and share a s trong psycholog- 
i c a l  t i e  t o  it. I n  t h i s  r e spec t  Korea must be regarded a s  having passed 
wel l  beyond t h e  traumatic s t a g e  of nation-building, a process i n  which 
many Third World coun t r i e s  a r e  cu r ren t ly  embroiled. Inherent  i n  t h e  
Korean na t iona l  consciousness a l s o  a r e  p o t e n t i a l  tendencies of xenophobia 
and chauvinism. Because Koreans endeavor t o  d i s t ingu i sh  themselves sharply 
from the peoples of o ther  na t ions ,  it o f f e r s  a f e r t i l e  ground f o r  t h e  
occasional  upsurge of an in tense ly  egocentr ic  nat ionalism, t o t a l l y  b l ind  
t o  t h e  world outside.  Excessive emphasis on everything "Korean," va r ious  
at tempts t o  mythicize her h i s t o r y  and t r a d i t i o n  i n  order  t o  heighten t h e  
sense of n a t i o n a l  consciousness., and t h e  seemingly anachronis t ic  r e v i v a l  
of t h e  o ld  Confucian values. t h a t  had served wel l  t h e  simple agrar ian  soc ie ty  
of t h e  pas t  but  a r e  c l e a r l y  inappropriate i n  an indus t r i a l i zed  soc ie ty  of 
today, a r e  some of t h e  recent  manifestat ions of an egocentr ic  nationalism. 
I n  t h e i r  search  f o r  an ideology t h a t  can j u s t i f y  the  regime, t h e  
yush in leade r s  chose t o s t r e s s  the  egocent r ic  a spec t s  of nat ional ism he- 
cause they f e l t  t h a t  t he  pub l i c  would respond e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  t o  such 
symbols. Howwer, it must a l s o  he noted t h a t  t h e  yushin l e a d e r s  d id  not  
espouse a narrow nat ional ism i n  t h e i r  economic po l i c i e s .  I n  p a r t ,  it 
w a s  because of t h e i r  commitment t o  a growth po l i cy  which r e q u i r e s  f o r  
its success continuous inflows of fore ign  c a p i t a l  and technology. There 
appear t o  be inhe ren t ly  c o n f l i c t i n g  elements i n  the  yushin  nat ional ism. 
On t h e  one hand, i t  s t r e s s e d  the  exc lus iv i ty  of t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  and 
c u l t u r a l  cha rac te r s ,  and on t h e  o the r ,  t h e  paramount goa l  of a rap id  eco- 
nomic growth through i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade ,  The l a t t e r  
goal  could not  be achieved i n  an ideo log ica l  framework of a narrow ego- 
c e n t r i c  na t ional i sm but i n s t ead ,  requi red  a more pragmatic in te rna t ion-  
alism. The yushin  l eade r s  d i d  not  s e e  any inconsis tency i n  t h e i r  na t ional i sm 
because they thought a growing economy would s t rengthen  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
goals .  Howwer, t h e  inward pos tures  of egocent r ic  na t ional i sm produced 
an obsession wi th  g l o r i f i c a t i o n  of the p a s t ,  t h e  preserva t ion  of "old" 
ways, and a t  times, an  anachronois t ic  self-delusion,  a l l  of which discourage 
progress ive  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  changes'. 'The economic pragmatism motivated 
by t h e  growth s t r a t e g y  unleashed the  very oppos i te  fo rces ,  genera t ing  in-  
creased demands f o r  advanced fo re ign  technologies ,  urban s t y l e s  of l i f e  
a s soc ia t ed  wi th  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  western na t ions ,  progress ive  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  changes. Thus, t he  yushin  nat ional ism w a s  s t r u c t u r a l l y  incons i s t en t .  
Nationalism could undergo a fundamental change i n  chaxactex i n  a 
divided nat ion.  Because of i t s  s p e c i a l  emotional appeals  t o  t h e  people, 
t h e  l eade r s  of the  regimes i n  both halves of Korea s a w  i t  convenient t o  
cons t ruc t  a n a t i o n a l i s t i c  ideology. I n  t h e  course of t ime nationalikwa, e 
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i n i t i a l l y  a sense  of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with a s i n g l e  p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t y ,  hetwde 
c l o s e l y  entwined wi th  t h e  regime ideology, i n s t ead .  A s  each reg ime  gainkd I 
s t r e n g t h  i n  i t s  legi t imacy,  so d i d  i t s  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  ideology. Consequently, 
na t iona l i sm which began a s  a sense  of a s i n g l e  n a t i o n a l  i d e n t i t y  may cease  
t o  he what i t  was .  There i s  a real p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i f  t h e  condi t ion  of 
d i v i s i o n  cont inues  i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  t h e  Ibxean na t iona l i sm would no longer  
be a common i d e n t i t y  about one p o l i t i c a l  community. 
Truncated Bel ief  System. The Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  con ta ins  many in-  
cons i s t enc i e s .  I n  p a r t ,  t h i s  is i n w i t a b l e  i n  a s o c i e t y  where r ap id  s o c i a l  
changes are tak ing  place.  Urbanizat ion,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  and t ranspor-  
t a t i o n  and communications dwel~pxuent  e n t a i l  b a s i c  changes i n  t h e  s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s  and concomitantly,  changes i n  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  values.  Some 
o l d  v a l u e s  a r e  d iscarded  and new ones a r e  adopted i n  t h i s  change process .  
The incons i s t enc i e s  appear not  because t h e  o l d  v a l u e s  a r e  rep laced  by t h e  
new ones but  r a t h e r  because of t h e  ways i n  which t h e  replacement occurs .  
The new b e l i e f s  and v a l u e s  a r e  o f t e n  added t o ,  bu t  no t  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o ,  
the e x i s t i n g  ones r e s u l t i n g  i n  a compartmentalized p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re .  
The incons i s t enc i e s  may be b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e d  by some s p e c i f i c  examples. 
Members of t h e  National  Assembly, unquest ionably one of t h e  most p o l i t i c a l l y  
soph i s t i ca t ed  groups, perce ive  popular r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  as t h e i r  main respon- 
s i b i l i t y .  They f e e l  s t rong ly  committed t o  t h e  g o a l  of r ep re sen t ing  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  and opin ions  of t h e i x  cons t i t uenc ie s .  Bowever, they a l s o  e x h i b i t  
an  a s ton i sh ing  l a c k  of any c l e a r  conception of whom they should he repre-  
sen t ing .  They o f t e n  mention t h a t  they s t r i v e  t o  r ep re sen t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
of t h e  people,  a h ighly  vague e n t i t y  a t  b e s t .  I f  they do not  have a 
Z 
s p e c i f i c  group of people whose i n t e r e s t s  
represent ,  then what is  t h e  s ign i f i cance  
P 
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of popular representa t ion?  
and sent iments  they wish t o  
of t h e i r  s t rong comitment t o  
It is  obvious t h a t  t h e  National  
Assemblymen hold an incons i s t en t  conception of t h e i r  job. They a r e  o f t e n  
unaware of such inconsis tency,  s i n c e r e  i n  t h e i r  be l i e f  t h a t  they a r e  t r u l y  
working f o r  representa t ion .  
The incons i s t en t  b e l i e f s  a r e  even more conspicuous among t h e  publ ic .  
The widespread and ardent  publ ic  a s p i r a t i o n  f o r  a democratic form of gov- 
ermnent is  beyond any douht i n  Korea today, A recent  study of some 2,000 
a d u l t  c i t i z e n s  shows t h a t  a preponderant m a j o r i t y  of 80 percent  expressed 
t h e i r  c l e a r  preference f o r  a democratic form of guvernment, organized along 
t h e  l i n e  of Western d e m o ~ r a c i e s . ~  While they show such s t rong f e e l i n g s  
about democracy, they a l s o  embrace a t  t h e  same time many anti-democratic 
a t t i t u d e s .  I f  they t ake  t h e i r  democratic a s p i r a t i o n  se r ious ly ,  they must 
a l s o  develop a set of b e l i e f s  and a t t i t u d e s  consonant wi th  i t s  r e a l i z a t i o n ,  
On t h e  contrary,  var ious  s t u d i e s  show that t h e  Koreans tend t o  be p o l i t i c a l l y  
apa the t i c ,  non-part icipatory,  and highly submissive t o  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  Also, 
they tend t o  show a low sense of p o l i t i c a l  e f f i cacy ,  denying themselves an  
a c t i v e  r d l e  i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  process. A l l  of t hese  a t t r i b u t e s  are i n  sharp 
c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e i r  democratic a sp ixa t ions ,  Thus, t h e  mass p o l i t i c a l  be l i e f  
system is  truncated,  probably t o  a g r e a t e r  ex ten t  than among the na t ion ' s  
e l i t e s .  
The cons i tuent  elements of the Koxean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  a r e  not  
w e l l  i n t eg ra t ed  sw as t o  g i y e  it a coherent s t r u c t u r e .  C lus t e r s  of b e l i e f s  
and va lues ,  o f t e n  cont radic tory  t o  each o the r ,  exist s i d e  by side forming 
a t runca ted  be l i e f  system. These incons i s t enc ie s  may account f o r  much of 
t h e  v a c i l l a t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  behaviors  so  t y p i c a l  of Korean p o l i t i c s .  Although 
. 
t h e r e  are hound t o  he  some incons i s t enc i e s  i n  any p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e ,  what 21 
makes t h e  c a s e  of Korea unique is t h e  ex ten t  t o  which her c u l t u r e  is  
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t runcated.  
Authori tar ianism. Scholars.  have ohsenred almost unanimously a pronounced 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  tendency i n  t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re .  The f o u r  f a c e s  
of au tho r i t a r i an i sm a s  manifested i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process  deserve some 
f u r t h e r  comment. The f i r s t  i s  the nea r ly  b l ind  submission t h a t  the people 
o f f e r  t o  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Because of t h e  inf luence  of t he  Confucian 
p r e s c r i p t i o n  of a  proper s o c i a l  o rder  based upon r i g i d  h ie rarchy  and s t a t u s ,  
Koreans have learned  f r o m t h e i r  young ages  t o  d e f e r  t o  t h e i r  s o c i a l  superiors., 
These submissive a t t i t u d e s  and h e l i e f s  applyewith an equal  f o r c e  t o  a l l  
p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s .  The people tend t o  show an  ind i sc r imina te  deference  
t o  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  l eaders .  Submissive a t t i t u d e s  such a s  t h e s e  a l s o  reduce 
t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  extend o r  withhold t h e i r  support  f o r  a l eade r  when h i s  
performance proves t o  be inadequate ,  
Another f a c e  of au tho r i t a r i an i sm is widespread p o l i t i c a l  apathy. 
By d e f i n i t i o n ,  a  submissive a t t i t u d e  discourages an a c t i v e  c i t i z e n s h i p  
r o l e  i n  p o l i t i c s .  Many people,  e s p e c i a l l y  among those  who have deeply 
ingrained d e f e r e n t i a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  f e e l  t h a t  p o l i t i c s  and governmental a f f a i r s  
a r e  something beyond t h e i r  comprehension and t h a t  i t  is inappropr i a t e  f o r  
them t o  p lay  an a s s e r t i v e  ro l e .  They a l s o  be l i eve  t h a t  i t  is b e t t e r  t o  
leave t h e  p o l i t i c a l  problems t o  t h e b  l e a d e r s  o r  t o  government o f f i c i a l s  
t o  solve.  The r e s u l t  of a l l  t h i s  i s  p u h l i c  apathy and indi f fe rence ,  
Authori tar ianism makes p o l i t i c a l  apathy s o c i a l l y  acceptable .  Apathy is 
a l s o  caused by an i n t e n s e  f e e l i n g  of p o l i t i c a l  disenchantment, Fee l ings  
c of disenchantment were p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t rong among well-educated urban 
middle c l a s s  memhers, i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  and s tudents .  They were deeply d is -  
c 
a f fec t ed  and d i s i l l u s i o n e d  by an unresponsive regime and developed a 
cyn ica l  a t t i t u d e  toward p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Because they r e a l i z e d  
t h a t  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  had absolutely no impact on governmental a c t i o n s ,  
they made a conscious dec is ion  t o  withdraw from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a rena ,  
The t h i r d  f a c e  of au thor i ta r ian ism is revealed i n  the a t t i t u d e s  
among leaders .  I n  their r e l a t i o n s  w i t h - c i t i z e n s  t h e  l eade r s  tend t o  
exh ib i t  arrogance a s  w e l l  a s  a d i s t o r t e d  sense of self-r ighteousness.  
Their es t imate  of t h e  c i t i z e n s '  p o l i t i c a l  capac i ty  tends  t o  he low, al- 
though they would no t  openly say it, Consequently, they show l i t t l e  
respec t  f o r  those whom they govern, be l iev ing  t h a t  t h e  people, i f  not  
s tupid ,  are ignorant ,  Moreover, they have no s t rong conception t h a t  t h e i r  
s t a t u s  and power a r e  u l t ima te ly  derived from t h e  people. Typical of such 
an a t t i t u d e  is  one expressed i n  t h e  well-known popular adage, t h e  kwanjon 
minbi, o r  " the o f f i c i a l s  revered and t h e  people despised." The government 
o f f i c i a l s  do not  t ake  the  concept of publ ic  s e r v i c e  se r ious ly ,  nor do they 
usual ly  f e e l  accountable t o  the  people whom they a r e  presumed t o  serve ,  
The elitism described above i s  deeply rooted  i n  t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  cul- 
t u r e  and plays a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  shaping her  bureaucra t ic  p o l i t i c s  today, 
Personalism is  the  f o u r t h  f a c e  of au thor i ta r ian ism.  In  t h e  postwar 
period t h e r e  has been a d e f i n i t e  tendency, i n  both South and North Korea, 
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power t o  g r a y i t a t e  t o  a s i n g l e  leader .  By personalism, we 
r e f e r  t o  t h i s  tendency of power concentrat ion i n  a person ins t ead  of i n  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I n  South Korea, t h e  executiye l eade r s  have always wielded 
supreme power, o f t en  i n  c l e a r  cont radic t ion  t o  t h e  formal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t i p u l a t i o n s .  I f  one were t o  determine t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power i n  
Korem s o c i e t y ,  i t  would be wise f o r  him t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  supreme l eade r  
and those  who have t h e  p r i v i l e g e s  of see ing  him personal ly .  One most 
r e l i a b l e  index of a c t u a l  power i s  how f r equen t ly  and how long a p r i v a t e  
audience an ind iv idua l  can o b t a i n  from t h e  supreme l eade r ,  no t  t h e  formal  
rank of h i s  o f f i c i a l  pos i t i on .  To put  t h e  ma t t e r  more b l u n t l y ,  t h e  prime 
m i n i s t e r  and h i s  cabine t  members ox t h e  Supreme Court j u s t i c e s  have much 
l e s s  in f luence  than t h e  head of t h e  P r e s i d e n t h  body guards,  h i s  personal  
s t a f f s ,  t h e  heads 04 i n t e l l i g e n c e  o rga inza t ions ,  a l l  of whom have d a i l y  
con tac t s  w i th  t h e  supreme leadex. Phys i ca l  access  t o  t h e  supreme power 
holder  is t h e  s i n g l e  most lmpmtant  sou rce  of power. 
Personal ized  power is l i k e l y  t o  occur i n  t h e  c u l t u r a l  environment 
where t h e  people a r e  h a b i t u a l l y  d e f e r e n t i a l  t o  t h e i r  l eaders .  Among 
Koreans t h e r e  is a tendency t o  a t t r i b u t e  power and a u t h o r i t y  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  
l eade r s  and no t  t o  t he  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  which t h e s e  l e a d e r s  serve.  They 
seem t o  f e e l  more a t  home wi th  t h e  idea  of personal ized  a u t h o r i t y  than  
wi th  t h e  idea  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  power. Because of personalism, a  
11 command" s t y l e  of p o l i t i c s  comes t o  p reva i l .  Reple te  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
language a r e  phrases  l i k e  " H i s  Excel lency 's  d i r e c t i v e , "  " the i n s t r u c t i o n  ffom 
above," and "the o rde r s  from t h e  Blue House ( t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  o f f i c i a l  res idence) , "  
a l l  c a r ry ing  more f o r &  than  any o t h e r  formal government po l i cy  announcement. The 
command s t y l e  of p o l i t i c s  is pervas ive  throughout t h e  s o c i e t y ,  d i scouraging  any 
I upward f low of communication from below. The government bureaucracy wi th  its 
excess ive  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  is a p r b e  example; much of i ts  ope ra t ion  is 
devoted t o  t h e  downward flows of admin i s t r a t i ve  d i r e c t i v e s  and sCldom t h e  
reverse .  We spoke only of personalism centered around t h e  supreme l e a d e r ,  
C but  i n  f a c t ,  s i m i l a r  phenomena can he  observed elsewhere. I n  hus iness  
corpora t ions ,  p o l i t i c a l  par t ies . ,  m i l i t a r y  organiza t ions ,  and o the r  
f a c t i o n a l  groupings e x i s t  t he  same s t rong  pe r sona l i t y  o r i e n t a t i o n s .  
That power tends  t o  he a s soc i a t ed  wi th  s p e c i f i c  i nd iv idua l s ,  and not  
w i th  the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  which they serve ,  is one marked f e a t u r e  of t h e  
Korean p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re .  
Formalism. There is a tendency i n  t h e  Korean c u l t u r e  t o  emphasize formal ,  
r a t h e r  than suhs t an t ive ,  a spec t s  of s o c i a l  behaviors.  The p rop r i e ty  of 
a behavior is s t r e s s e d  and judged hy whether o r  no t  i t  possesses  a 
,I Q 3 myongbun." The myonghun is  a comp3ex and o f t a n  ambiguous a i l t u r a l  
concept, meaning roughly a l e g i t i m a t e  b a s i s  of s o c i a l  ac t ion .  For an 
a c t i o n  t o  be regarded a s  l e g i t i m a t e  i t  must be congruent w i th  some gen- 
e r a l  and a b s t r a c t  e t h i c a l  p r inc ip l e s .  An obsess ive  concern wi th  t h e  
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myongbun l e a d s  t o  an excess ive  preoccupation wi th  t h e  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
of one 's  a c t i o n ,  i n s t ead  of a s e r ious  d iscuss ion  of t h e  suhstance of 
an  a c t i o n  inc luding  i ts  concre te  consequences. Forms and s t y l e s  of 
behaviors a r e  considered important,  and t h e  m e r i t s  of an  a c t i o n  a r e  
o f t e n  judged on t h i s  b a s i s ,  no t  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  subs t an t ive  program 
of an ac t ion .  
P o l i t i c a l  express ions  of formalism a r e  q u i t e  d iverse .  I n  p o l i t -  
i c a l  debates  it t akes  t h e  form of an unbridgeable c o n f l i c t  between prin-  
c i p l e s .  The con te s t an t s  i n  a deba te  tend t o  draw t h e i r  b a t t l e  l i n e  
along a s e t  of a b s t r a c t  e t h i c a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  While they 
concent ra te  on t h e  r e l a t i v e  m e r i t s  of such. p r i n c i p l e s  underlying t h e i r  
pos i t i ons ,  they o f t e n  ignoxe t h e  suhs t an t ive  merits of t h e i r  proposed 
ac t ions .  Consequently, p o l i t i c a l  debates  become debates  over opposing 
p r i n c i p l e s  which a r e ,  by t h e i r  ve ry  na tu re ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  reso lve .  One 
r e s u l t  of t h i s  i s  the  frequent p o l i t i c a l  s talemates and immobilisme 
i n  Korean p o l i t i c s .  Nowhere i s  t h i s  tendency more sharply r w e a l e d  
than i n  tFLe preceedings of the National Assembly. There were numerous 
occasions i n  which the pa r t i san  c o n f l i c t s  reached such a pofnt t h a t  no 
normal dialogues between the government and opposition members were pos- 
s ib le .  A t  times the  government par ty  members ran t h e  AssemEdy alone, 
boycotted t o t a l l y  hy the  opposition members. A t  other  times, the  oppo- 
s i t i o n  members obstructed the  scheduled meetings by blockading the  
Assembly building t o  keep the gwernment members out m by occupying 
the  rostrum t o  obst ruct  a meeting. I f  a l l  of these f a i l e d ,  the  opposit ion 
resorted to ext ra-const i tu t ional  methods hy c a l l i n g  f o r  a mass demonstra- 
t i o n  of t h e i r  sympathizers. Both c i v i l i t y  and c o l l e g i a l i t y ,  the  two 
r e q u i s i t e s  of normal l e g i s l a t i v e  process, were absent too of ten  i n  the  
Korean National Assembly. The i n f l e x i b l e  s t y l e s  of confrontat ion among 
p o l i t i c i a n s  can be accounted fox €iy t h e k  r i g i d  adherence t o  a b s t r a c t  
pr inciples .  And such a t t i t u d e s  have a l s o  discouraged the  formation of 
a pragmatic bargaining cu l tu re  i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  a s  wel l  a s  i n  o ther  
p o l i t i c a l  arenas. 
Formalism i s  a l s o  manifest i n  t h e  excessive a t t e n t i o n  and ca re  
given t o  the l e g a l  aspects  of p o l i t i c a l  i ssues .  For example, the  consti-  
t u t i o n a l  i ssues  always a t t r a c t  an enormous amount of public a t t e n t i o n ,  
not  so  much hecause they a f f e c t  the  fundamental s t r u c t u r e s  of t h e  p o l i t y  
but because they involve dehates over formal pr inciples .  The na t ion ' s  
cons t i tu t ion  has undergone severa l  amendments s ince  1948, each time 
arousing in tense  popular excitement. However, once a new cons t i tu t ion  
was adopted, the  people tended t o  ignore i t  and proceeded a s  i f  
c nothing had changed. The subs t an t ive  a spec t s  of a p p l i c a t i o n  r ece ive  
r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  while. t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of a formal  cons t i -  
t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o r  o t h e r  goyernmental agencies  consumes a l l  t h e  energy 
t h e r e  is. I f  cons t i t u t iona l i sm had f a i l e d  i n  Korea, i t  was not  so  much 
because of any s e r i o u s  f a u l t s  contained i n  t h e  w r i t t e n  documents but 
r a t h e r  because they  were egregious ly  abused o r  ignored i n  app l i ca t ions .  
The same is t r u e  withmany government po l i cy  programs, too ,  There is 
a tendency among p o l i t i c a i n s  and government o f f i c i a l s  t o  expend a g r e a t  
d e a l  of a t t e n t i o n  and energy u n t i l  a po l i cy  is formulated. Once the 
po l i cy  is promulgated, u s u a l l y  with a g r e a t  d e a l  of f~an fa re ,  i t  is  
l i k e l y  t o  become q u i e t l y  forgot ten .  The bp lemen ta t ion  of a program 
seldom a t t r a c t s  s e r i o u s  a t t e n t i o n  from t h e  policy-makers themselves o r  
from t h e  publ ic .  The formal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  and o the r  po l i cy  
programs, almost always t h e  r e s u l t  of pa ins tak ingly  extended d e l i b e r a t i o n s ,  
o f t en  end up being nothing more than p lans  on paper. 
Formalism discourages s e r i o u s  pub l i c  deba tes  on t h e  subs t an t ive  
i s sues .  It tends t o  d i r e c t  p o l i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  away from t h e  i s s u e s  
and away from t h e  aolutTons of problems t h a t  have di t?ect  hear ings  on 
d a i l y  lives of c i t i z e n s .  One consequence of formalism is, the re fo re ,  
an endless  and sterile p o l i t i c a l  debate  which does no t  produce t h e  r e a l  
r e s u l t s .  Another consequence is t h e  interminable succession of new 
pol icy  programs even before  t h e  o ld  programs a r e  f u l l y  implemented. 
Small Group Collect ivism. The t r a d i t i o n a l  Korean c u l t u r e  was h o s t i l e  
t o  individualism. Ind iv idua l s  were always i d e n t i f i e d  a s  p a r t  of groups 
such as f ami l i e s ,  c l ans ,  o r  v i l l a g e  communities. Col lec t iv i sm r a t h e r  
than  ind iv idua l i sm defined t h e  i d e n t i t y  of an ind iv idua l .  This  c o l l e c t i v e  
o r i e n t a t i o n  s t i l l  p e r s i s t s  i n  Korea. In t h e  wake of massive popula t ion  
moyements caused by t h e  d i v i s i o n  i n  1945, t h e  Korean War of 1950-53, and 
r ap id  u rban iza t ion  i n  t h e  1960s, co l l ec t iy i sm had weakened cons iderably ,  
But i n  t h e  197Qs we witnessed a reve;rsal of t h i s  t r end  through t h e  re- 
surgence of a n  i n t e n s e  m a l l  group consciousness.  I t  was caused hy a s e r i e s  
of regime p o l i c i e s  t o  r e e s t a b l i s h  t h e  c u l t u r a l  and s o c i a l  i d e n t i t y  among 
Koreans. P a r t  of t h e  regime e f f o r t  was d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  red iscovery  of t h e  
p a s t  and t r a d i t i o n s ,  therehy encouraging t h e  g l o r i f i c a t i o n  and even some 
d i s t o r t i o n  of h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t s .  A l l  of t hese  were done t o  s e rve  and s t r eng then  
t h e  regime ideology, i . e . ,  i t s  egocen t r i c  nat ional ism.  Prominent r e d i s c o v e r i e s  
included? t h e  s p l r i t  of communal cooperat ion,  familism based on t h e  Confucian 
precept  of f i l i a l  p i e t y ,  a sense  of r e g i o n a l  p r ide  and i d e n t i t y ,  and t h e  
idea  of a n  a b s o l u t e  l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  r u l e r ,  A l l  of t hese  were important p a r t s  
of t h e  c u l t u r a l  foundat ions upon which t h e  o l d  dynas t i c  r u l e s  were once 
b u i l t .  The r e v i v a l  of t hese  t r a d i t i o n a l  va lues  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  resurgence 
of pa r t i cu l a r i sm,  one component of which i s  t h e  small group consciousness.  
I n  Korea, small  groups a r e  fmmed on t h e  b a s i s  of t h r e e  types of rela- 
t ionship :  family and k insh ip  t i e s ,  school  t i e s ,  and r e g i o n a l  connect ions,  
Because membership i n  t hese  groups is defined by p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c  c r i t e r i a ;  
i t  is p r a c t i c a l l y  closed t o  any ou t s ide r s .  Moreover, t h e s e  groups command 
an  i n t e n s e  f e e l i n g  of l o y a l t y  from t h e i r  members. Such at tachments  t o  s m a l l  
p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c  groups h inder  broadly based s o c i a l  cooperat ion.  P r e c i s e l y  
hecause of this m a l l  group co l l ec t iv i sm,  Koreans f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
form coopera t ive  a c t i v i t i e s  t ranscending t h e  boundaries of t h e i r  own small 
immediate groups. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  po in t  a b i t  more, l e t  u s  cons ider  
t h e  concept of amoral familism suggested by Edward I3anfieldo4 He has  
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argued t h a t  the  poverty i n  southern I t a l y  is t h e  consequence of t h e  lack 
of s o c i a l  cooperation among members of a community. The laCk of coopera- 
t i o n  is caused by t h e  deeply ingrained suspicion and d i s t r u s t  that people 
hold toward other members of t h e  community. I n  h i s  view, t h e  pr incipal  
source of t h i s  s o c i a l  d i s t r u s t  l i a a  i n  t h e i r  in tense  f e e l i n g s  of loyal ty  
t o  t h e i r  f ami l i e s  a t  the  exclusion of a l l  o thers .  T h e  s o c i a l  world out- 
s i d e  t h e i r  immediate famil ies  is therefore  regarded a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  h o s t i l e ,  
Also, i t  serves a s  an object  t o  he exploited t o  t h e  best  of one's a b i l i t y  
f o r  the  sake of the  benef i t s  t o  one's family. Social  r e l a t i o n s  constructed 
upon this premise a r e  bound t o  be f l u i d  and amoral, Consequently, much of 
s o c i a l  behavior is  unrestrained by a sense of morali ty,  kmoral familism 
r e f e r s  t o  this exclusive loyal ty  t o  one's family. 
Although the  small group c o l l e c t i v i a n  i n  Korea is by no means i d e n t i c a l  
t o  Banfield 's  amoral familism, the re  exist c e r t a i n  s i m i l a r i t i e s .  I n  Korea 
small group o r ien ta t ion  encompasses something much more than familism se; 
i t  a l s o  includes o ther  types of groups formed on t h e  bas i s  of school t i e s  
and bir thplaces.  They a r e  s imi lar ,  however, i n  some respects ,  The sense 
of exclusive loyal ty  t o  small groups is  a s  in tense  a s  t h e  I t a l i a n  familism. 
Furthermore, small groups a l so  cause bas ica l ly  the  same h o s t i l e  and d i s -  
t r u s t f u l  a t t i t u d e s  among Koreans. They tend t o  behave amorally i n  s o c i a l  
r e la t ions ,  especia l ly  when the i n t e r e s t s  of t h e i r  own groups a r e  a t  s take.  
What we might c a l l  t h e  amoral small group col lec t iv ism appears to  operate 
i n  the  Koxean 6tociety. 
Amoral small group c o l l e c t i y i m  a f f e c t s  Korean p o l i t i c s  i n  severa l  
major ways. F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h e  people wha axe preoccupied with the  l imited 
i n t e r e s t s  of t h e i r  cmn groups.tend t o  ignore the i n t e r e s t s  and welfare 
of o t h e r  members of s o c i e t y ,  a s o c i a l  contex t  which does no t  encouxage 
t h e  deve lomen t  of a s t rong  sense  ox pub l i c  regard .  Second, i t  g i v e s  
rise t o  p o l i t i c a l  fac t iona l i sm.  Fac t iona l i sm has  long heen a cfuronic 
f e a t u r e  of Korean p o l i t i c s .  It is  almost  ub iqu i tous  i n  a l l  pub l i c  and 
p r i v a t e  organiza t ions .  F a c t i o n a l  s t r i f e  exists wi th in  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  and t h e  government hureaucracy. The f a c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  
o f t e n  fo l low persona l  networks b u i l t  upon family,  school ,  o r  r eg iona l  
ties. Because of d i v i s i v e  f a c t i o n a l  s t r i f e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
oppos i t ion  p a r t i e s ,  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach ieve  u n i t y  i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i ons .  I n  f a c t ,  i t  is not  i naccu ra t e  a t  a l l  t o  regard  Korean p a r t i e s  
a s  l oose ly  organized f e d e r a t i o n s  of competing f a c t i o n s ,  each l e d  by a 
p o l i t i c i a n  of some s t a t u r e .  
Third,  t h e  smal l  group consciousness  i n f luences  t h e  ways i n  which 
c i t i z e n s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  p o l i t i c s .  Huntington and Nelson have d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
two types  of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n :  autonomous and ~ n o b i l i z e d . ~  The autonomous 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  kind of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t h a t  arises from p o l i t i c a l  
awareness. Those who a r e  w e l l  informed of p o l i t i c s  and have a c r y s t a l l i z e d  
preference ,  engage i n  p o l i t i c s  t o  r e g i s t e r  t h e i r  views. These a c t i v i t i e s  
ake  s e l f - a s s e r t i v e  i n  cha rac t e r  and thus ,  should be regarded as autonomous.. 
The mobil ized p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t s  i n  which some 
people  engage merely i n  deference  t o ,  o r  i n  f e a r  o f ,  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Th i s  
kind of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  does no t  involve  much consc&ous p o l i t i c a l  choice,  
hu t  i n s t e a d  is a man i f e s t a t i on  of compliant behaviors.  I n  e l e c t o r a l  con- 
tests t h e  a l l  group n e t w o r k s a x e  ex t ens ive ly  u t i l i z e d  by cand ida t e s  
and p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  t h e s e  networks serve a s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
v e h i c l e s  f o r  v o t e  mobi l iza t ion .  The ex t ens ive  u t i l i z a t i o n  of s m a l l  groups 
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C l eads  t o  two important consequences. One i s  t h e  s t r i k i n g l y  high l e v e l  
of vot ing  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Because v i r t u a l l y  every a d u l t  c i t i z e n  is  a 
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member of one of t hese  small  groups, it i s  r e l a t i v e l y  easy t o  b r ing  out  
people t o  p o l l s  through mohi l iza t ion  of personal  networks, which r e s u l t s  
in a high vot ing  r a t e .  Another consequence is t h e  mobilized p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
The r e l a t i v e l y  high vot ing  r a t e  among the r u r a l  r e s i d e n t s  does no t  neces- 
s a r i l y  mean t h a t  t he  v o t e r s  make conscious p o l i t i c a l  choices as do t h e  
autonomous pa r t i c ipan t s .  Nany go t o  the p o l l s  simply because they a r e  t o l d  
t o  do so, knowing very l i t t l e  ahout what t he  main i s s u e s  involved o r  what t h e  
r e l a t i v e  m e r i t s  of t he  candidates  are. There i s  evidence t h a t  a  s i z a b l e  
p a r t - o f  vot ing  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  Korea i s  i n  f a c t  the ~ e s u l t  of mohi l iza t ion .  6 
The s m a l l  group c o l l e c t i v i m  discourages autonomous p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  
a n  important r e q u i s i t e  of democratic development. 
P o l i t i c a l  Fhotionalism. I n  t h e  Korean c u l t u r e  runs a  deep undercurrent  
of emotionalism. Expressive of such emotionalism a r e  the two Korean 
words, jEFg and - ha*? Both c o n s t i t u t e  the  most popular themes of novels ,  
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poetry,  plays,  f i l m s  and popular sgnga. The word "J-It means l i t e r a l l y  
human fee l ings ,  very much ak in  t o  t h e  Japanese not ion of ninjo.  It s t r e s s e s  
warm, personal ,  and emotional a spec t s  of s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  I n  t h i s  sense  
i t  s tands  i n  opposif ion t o  more r a t i o n a l  and c r i t i c a l  o r i en ta t ions .  The 
meaning of %ant' is so  s u b t l e  and complex t h a t  i t  is beyond our capaci ty  here  
t o  render an  accura t e  t r a n s l a t i o n .  W e  must l eave  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  t o  
o the r s  who have g r e a t e r  l i t e r a r y  imaginations. S u f f i c e  it t o  say here,  
howeyer, t h a t  t h e  word means something of a pathos o r  a  b i t t e r  r e g r e t .  
The c e n t r a l  poin t  is t h a t  emotional a spec t s  of s o c i a l  l k f e  r e c e i v e  consid- 
e r a b l e  emphasis i n  t h e  Korean cul ture .  Because of t h e i r  emotional i n c l i n a t i o n s  
.# 
Koreans a r e  e a s i l y  aroused and moved by t h e  f e e l i n g s  of j o n g  and w. 
P o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  of emotionalism may be b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e d  by a 
few examples. I n  1960 a s tudent  up r i s ing  l e d  t o  t h e  downfall  of Syngman 
Rhee's a u t o c r a t i c  regime. This  spontaneous mass upheaval a g a i n s t  t h e  
r ep re s s ive  government involved t h e  l o s s  of many l i v e s  and cons iderable  
bloodshed. On t h e  day when Rhee moved from t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  mansion t o  
h i s  p r i v a t e  q u a r t e r s  a f t e r  h i s  r e s igna t ion ,  a massive outpouring of p u b l i c  
sympathy f o r  t h e  deposed l eade r  occurred, almost bordering on an  open 
adu la t ion  of a hero. Crowds of t ens  of thousands l i n e d  up along t h e  streets, 
many showing t h e i r  emotions i n  tears a s  i f  they were g r i ev ing  t h e  l o s s  of 
a g r e a t  leader .  Even more spec t acu la r  were t h e  s i z e  of t h e  crowds and t h e  
emotions shown by them upon Rhee's dea th  some yea r s  later. Mi l l ions  of c i t -  
i zens  gr ieved openly a s  if they had l o s t  a g r e a t  benevolent leader .  Was 
he not  u l t i m a t e l y  r e spons ib l e  f o r  a l l  t h e  wrongdoing of t h e  r ep re s s ive  
L i b e r a l  regime? Was i t  no t  h i s  r ep re s s ive  r u l e  a g a i n s t  which they r o s e  
up? How could one exp la in  t h i s  sudden s h i f t  i n  pub l i c  mood? There w e r e  
many a t h e r  i n c i d e n t s  l i k e  t h i s  i n  Korean h i s to ry .  Swayed by t h e  f e e l i n g  
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of jong,  Koreans o f t e n  l o s e  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l  and c r i t i c a l  capac i ty  and a r e  
e a s i l y  swept i n t o  emotional outpourings. 
Emotional i n c l i n a t i o n s  corrode the  c r i t i c a l  a b i l i t y  of t h e  governed 
when they make judgements about t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e i r  l eadersh ip .  They 
condone t h e  wrongdoings of t h e i r  l e a d e r s  s o  r e g u l a r l y  t h a t  t h e r e  is no 
obvious incen t ive  f o r  t he  l e a d e r s  t o  a c t  responsibly.  Had t h e  people 
ac t ed  d i f f e r e n t l y  toward t h e  deposed Syngman Rhee, demonstrating t h e i r  
r a t i o n a l  capac i ty  t o  hold a l e a d e r  r e spons ib l e  f o r  a l l  h i s  r ep re s s ive  
p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  new genera t ion  of governmental l eade r s  might have learned  
a lesson. In  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of the  people's c r i t i c a l  judgements, t h e  new 
leaders  might have ac ted  more responsibly and responsively. Emotionalism 
c rea tes  a p o l i t i c a l  environment i n  which t h e  same corrupt  and repress ive  
government recurs,  unrestrained by any sustained c r i t i c i s m  by the  governed. 
Strong emotional elements i n  the  Korean c u l t u r e  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  t h e  people t o  sharply d i s t ingu i sh  publ ic  and p r i v a t e  a f f a i r s .  Because 
of the  p e r s i s t e n t  inf luence  of j8ng o r  personal f ee l ings ,  publ ic  o f f i c i a l s  
o f t en  a c t  i n  a  manner contrary t o  t h e i r  prescribed publ ic  ro le .  S imi lar ly ,  
indiv idual  c i t i z e n s  impose on o f f i c i a l s  t h e  kind of requests  t h a t  a r e  
publicly impermissible, taking advantage of personal  r e l a t i o n s  formed 
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outs ide  the  p o l i t i c a l  arena. The fee l ing  of jong plays a s i g n i f i c a n t  
p a r t  i n  such exchanges. What r e s u l t s  from a l l  of this mixing of publ ic  
duty and p r i v a t e  f ee l ings  is both confusion and ambiguity i n  the  various 
conducts of public  a f f a i r s .  The boundaries of public  r e spons ib i l i ty  
become blurred  because of the  frequent  in t rus ion  of p r iva te  motives and 
fee l ings .  One o f t en  witnesses inconsis tent  and v a c i l l a t i n g  behaviors 
among publ ic  o f f i c i a l s .  Pa r t  of the  reason f o r  such behavioral p a t t e r n s  
is  t h e  l ack  of a clear conception of t h e i r  publ ic  ro les ,  which is rooted 
i n  t h e i r  excessively emotional entanglements. 
Oppositional Syndrome. One notable aspect  of the  e l i te  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  
is the  pers is tence  of what w e  w i l l  c a l l  "the opposi t ional  mentality." 
Edward S h i l s  has suggested t h i s  concept i n  h i s  study of Indian i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  8 
It r e f e r s  to  a  tendency among the  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  t o  oppose a u t h o r i t i e s  f o r  
opposi t ion 's  sake. I n  the  Korean socie ty  a similar tendency e x i s t s ,  es- 
pec ia l ly  among t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  leaders ,  col lege  students ,  and p o l i t i c i a n s  
of opposition p a r t i e s .  Their opposi t ion to  the  government and i t s  p o l i c i e s  
tends t o  be extreme, allowing no room f o r  conc i l i a t ion .  Because they oppose 
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f o r  opposi t ion 's  sake, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s t r i k e  a  compromise acceptable 
b 
t o  both p a r t i e s  of a  conf l i c t .  I n  p a r t ,  t he  opposi t ional  menta l i ty  i s  a  4 
legacy from the  co lon ia l  past .  During the  period of Japanese r u l e  the  
opposi t ion was expressed i n  t h e  form of n a t i o n a l i s t i c  s t ruggles .  It was 
the  moral r i g h t  of a l l  Koreans t o  oppose the  co lon ia l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  There 
could be no compromise i n  these  s t rugg les  u n t i l  a  complete independence 
was a t ta ined.  Radical and v io len t  opposi t ion t o  the  Japanese r u l e  was re- 
garded a s  heroic  behavior, and the  more extreme the  opposi t ion behavior, 
the  more heroic  i t  was. Out of t h i s  na ture  of p o l i t i c a l  opposi t ion devel- 
oped the  tendency f o r  extreme opposi t ion behavior. The opposi t ion men- 
t a l i t y  formed under colonialism was ca r r i ed  i n t o  the  post-independence 
period. Opposition t o  a u t h o r i t i e s  and power i s  s t i l l  considered a s  some- 
thing t o  be admired and sometimes even a s  a  moral imperative among con- 
sc ien t ious  i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  Several recent  s tud ies  have shown the  p e r s i s t e n t  
e f f e c t s  of the  opposi t ional  syndrome among many Korean i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  9 
Several  c u l t u r a l  elements complement and re in fo rce  t h i s  opposi t ional  
mentality. The chronic fac t ional ism t h a t  we have discussed is one such 
element. Fact ional  loya l ty  requi res  its members t o  oppose a l l  o ther  groups 
without regard t o  the  mer i t s  of pos i t ions  taken by o thers .  Often, individ-  
u a l  loya l ty  is t e s t ed  by the  degree of the  vehemence with which one opposes 
o the r  groups. Such a  requirement of exc lus iv i ty  inevi tably  leads  t o  h o s t i l i t y  
and d i s t r u s t  i n  inter-group re la t ions .  Formalism may a l s o  exacerbate t h e  
tendency of opposition. Preoccupation with a  formal and a h s t r a c t  p r i n c i p l e  
i n  p o l i t i c a l  debates tends t o  r i g i d i f y  c o n f l i c t  between groups. It makes 
the  pragmatic r e so lu t ion  of c o n f l i c t s  d i f f i c u l t  because each group stubbornly 
freezes its position as a matter of principle. Opposition to the regime 
among college students, intellectual elites, and some politicians was of 
this kind. 
Opposition mentality hinders the development of a pragmatic bargain- 
ing culture, a prerequisite of the democratic process. Moreover, it inten- 
sifies political conflicts on all levels by polarizing the contesting 
groups. Conflicts of this kind often lead to political stalemates and 
immobilisme, as has so frequently been the case in the National Assembly. 
On numerous occasions in the past members of the government and opposition 
parties were embroiled in a toal conflict, bringing the legislative pro- 
cess to a complete standstill. In less extreme forms, oppositional men- 
tality manifests itself in confrontational and occasionally violent styles 
of politics which determine the patterns of partisan relations in the 
National Assembly. Oppositional syndrome in its most virulent form causes 
political instability by intensifying conflicts and imobilisme. 
Volatility and Unpredictability. To be conceptually precise, these two 
characteristics should not be treated as part of the political culture. 
Neither is the volatility in political behaviors nor are their unpredict- 
able changes the components of the belief system. Instead, they should 
be regarded as the behavioral consequences of the political culture. It 
is, nevertheless, important to consider these characteristics because 
they tell us something about how the political culture helps shape behavior 
pat terns. 
Korean political behaviors are often unpredictable. This is so 
because political relationships tend to be in a constant state of flux, 
making it difficult to form an organization of any permanence. Whether 
one ponders t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a leader  and *h i s  fol lowers o r  t h e  
r e l a t ionsh ips  among t h e  indiv iduals ,  t h e  nexus of these  personal  i n t e r -  
r e l a t i o n s  d i sp lays  a  highly f l u i d  charac ter .  lo No wonder is i t  t h a t  
the  durable c o a l i t i o n s  of p o l i t i c i a n s  do not  f requent ly  occur nor do 
the  s t a b l e  alignments of p o l i t i c a l  forces .  The f l u i d  s t a t e  of p o l i t i c a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  f r u s t r a t e s  a l l  e f f o r t s  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  powers, including 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  intermediate s o c i a l  organiza t ions ,  
and o ther  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l -  
i z a t i o n  r equ i re s  a  s t a b l e  and recurrent  p a t t e r n  of behaviors,  a  char- 
a c t e r i s t i c  which t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  does not  s e e m  t o  promote. 
Not only a r e  t h e  Korean p o l i t i c a l  behaviors f l u i d  but a l s o  highly 
v o l a t i l e  i n  charac ter .  Notice t h e  t o t a l  and almost masochist ic  sub- 
mission shown by t h e  Korean people f o r  t h e i r  r ep ress ive  regimes. For 
long periods of time they endured such rep ress ive  r u l e s  without much 
p ro tes t .  A period of t r a n q u i l i t y  prevai led  with a  majori ty of people 
remaining i n  t h e i r  f a t a l i s t i c  s i l ence .  However, t h i s  t r a n q u i l i t y  was 
o f t en  in t e r rup ted  by an abrupt  and sudden outburs t  of mass violence. 
The onslaught of mass upheavals is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p red ic t  i n  advance, 
because i t  fol lows a period of r e l a t i v e  t r a n q u i l i t y .  The s tudent  up- 
r i s i n g  of 1960 burs t  out  a t  t h e  moment when t h e  power of Syngman Rhee's 
regime reached i t s  zenith.  So i t  was with the  unexpected upr i s ings  i n  
Pusan and Masan, 1979. The f e r o c i t y  and d i s t ruc t iveness  wi th  which people 
plunge i n t o  v io lence  a r e  indeed astounding, i n  view of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they 
remain t o t a l l y  submissive during t h e  period of t r a n q u i l i t y .  The f luc-  
ua t ion  between t r a n q u i l i t y  and violence has charac ter ized  t h e  p o l i t i c s  
i n  recent  decades. And t h e  swif tness  and v io lence  with which 
people move from t o t a l  submission t o  a l l -ou t  def iance  suggest  t h e  v o l a t i l e  
na ture  of Korean p o l i t i c a l  behaviors .  
Why a r e  the  Korean p o l i t i c a l  behaviors  unpredic tab le  and v o l a t i l e ?  
The Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  provides p a r t  of t h e  explanat ion.  Of p a r t i c -  
u l a r  relevance here  a r e  seve ra l  a spec t s  of t he  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  t h a t  w e  
have discussed e a r l i e r :  t h e  t runcated na tu re  of t he  b e l i e f  system, author- 
i t a r i a n  a t t i t u d e s ,  p o l i t i c a l  emotionalism, oppos i t ional  syndrome, and small  
group col lec t iv ism.  We w i l l  argue t h a t  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  among these  f i v e  
c u l t u r a l  elements produces both u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  and v o l a t i l i t y .  The trun- 
cated b e l i e f  system meant the  l ack  of a c o n s i s t e n t  s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e  b e l i e f s  
and a t t i t u d e s  held by the  c i t i z e n s  and e l i t e s .  For example, while  t h e  
people express  an ardent  d e s i r e  f o r  a democratic form of government on t h e  
one hand, they a l s o  hold, on the  o the r  hand, a set of s t rong  b e l i e f s  and 
va lues  fundamentally d e s t r u c t i v e  of i t ,  namely h ighly  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  a t t i -  
tudes, t h e i r  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  make pragmatic compromises, and t h e i r  a t -  
t r a c t i o n  t o  personal ized powers. It is  extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t  
which p a r t  of t h e i r  compartmentalized b e l i e f  system w i l l  a s s e r t  i t s e l f  
a t  any given time and be transformed i n t o  concre te  p o l i t i c a l  ac t ions .  This 
unce r t a in ty  is a f a c t o r  con t r ibu t ing  t o  the  unpredic tab le  behavioral  pat- 
2 
t e rns .  
Personalism t h a t  we have t r e a t e d  a s  an a spec t  of au thor i ta r ian ism,  i s  
another  f a c t o r .  It r e f e r s  t o  the  tendency t o  bu i ld  a l l  power r e l a t i o n s  
around indiv idual  persons r a t h e r  than i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Personalized power is 
inhe ren t ly  less durable  than i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  powers. When a leader  who 
exerc ised  an absolu te  power co l l apses ,  t h e  whole system breaks up, leaving  
behind a complete power vacuum. The l ack  of an  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  means of 
p o l i t i c a l  succession c r e a t e s  a  p o l i t i c a l l y  v o l a t i l e  s i t u a t i o n .  The 
s t rong  undercurrent  of emotionalism t h a t  we have noted a s  an aspec t  of 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  i s  a l s o  a  f a c t o r .  There i s  no way of t e l l i n g  when 
t h e  ou tbur s t s  of suppressed emotions w i l l  occur. However, t hese  f e e l i n g s  
do i r u p t  i n  v i o l e n t  forms a f t e r  a  sus ta ined  per iod  of t r a n q u i l i t y .  The 
onse t  of emotional ou tbur s t s  is  abrupt  and s w i f t ,  catching t h e  r u l e r s  
of a  regime t o t a l l y  unprepared. No less s i g n i f i c a n t  a  f a c t o r  i s  t h e  r o l e  
of oppos i t iona l  menta l i ty  t h a t  we have a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  Korean i n t e l -  
l e c t u a l  e l i t e s .  When t h e r e  e x i s t s  l i t t l e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  mass upheaval, 
t h e  oppos i t iona l  menta l i ty  would be confined t o  a  small  group of d i sg run t l ed  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  They can do no more than p u t t i n g  up a  few sporadic and small 
s c a l e  o b s t r u c t i o n i s t  oppos i t ions ,  which might i r r i t a t e  t h e  regime l e a d e r s  
a  l i t t l e  but  does not  do any devas ta t ing  harm. But t h e  a l i e n a t e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  
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could p lay  a  c r u c i a l  r o l e  a s  c a t a l y s t s  i f  t h e r e  develops a  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a  
mass upr i s ing ,  providing t h e  movement wi th  leadersh ip ,  o rgan iza t iona l  s k i l l s ,  
and most important ly,  an  ideo log ica l  platform around which t h e  people 
can r a l l y .  The p e r s i s t e n c e  of an  oppos i t ional  menta l i ty  s u s t a i n s  t h e  w i l l  
t o  r e s i s t  oppressive regimes. Small group attachment a f f e c t s  t h e  cha rac te r  
of s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s .  It diminishes the  b a s i s  of broad 
s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  cooperation. Excessive preoccupation wi th  t h e  in- 
t e r e s t s  of one's own immediate group r e s u l t s  i n  an unwil l ingness t o  co- 
ope ra t e  genuinely wi th  members of o t h e r  small  groups. Consequently, 
suspicion and d i s t r u s t  cha rac te r i ze  many aspec t s  of s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  
A l l  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b u i l t  upon such a  premise a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be 
f l u i d  and unstable.  
Although each of these  c u l t u r a l  components ind iv idua l ly  has a  r o l e  
i n  shaping unpredictable p o l i t i c a l  behavior, a sudden abrupt e sca la t ion  
of mass violence on a l a r g e  s c a l e  requi res  something more, however. A 
massive eruption i s  l i k e l y  t o  occur when each of these  c u l t u r a l  tendencies 
converge i n  a mutually re inforc ing manner. Metaphorically, w e  may th ink  
of f i v e  l i n e s - o f  c u l t u r a l  forces  running on a space, occasionally in te r -  
sec t ing  with others .  The point  a t  which an abrupt  e sca la t ion  of mass 
violence occurs is  where these  l i n e s  come together  t o  i n t e r s e c t .  What 
p r e c i p i t a t e s  such a simultaneous convergence of c u l t u r a l  fo rces  and ex- 
a c t l y  a t  what point  i t  occurs a r e  t h e  questions which requ i re  research  
i n  the  future.  
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Origins and Development 
The unconditional surrender of Japan t o  t h e  a l l i e d  powers i n  1945 
marked the  end of her 36 years  of co lon ia l  r u l e  over Korea. The Japanese 
r u l e  i n  Korea (1910-1945) was a r u t h l e s s  and despotic  one, which l e f t  
very l i t t l e  room f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of the  Korean people i n  any s i g n i f i c a n t  
aspect  of p o l i t i c s .  It was a harsh co lon ia l  r u l e  t h a t  the  triumphant 
conquerors imposed on t h e  sub jec t s  of a defeated country, even harsher 
i n  many respects  than the  co lon ia l  r u l e  of the  Western powers i n  Africa 
and Asia. Although the re  were numerous res i s t ence  movements agains t  
the  co lon ia l  regime, both within and outs ide  the  country, a majori ty 
of the  Korean people did not have any r e a l  opportunity t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
p o l i t i c s  o r  t o  acquire the  experience of self-governanae. By the  time 
the  country was l i b e r a t e d  from Japan, the re  exis ted  nesther  a coherent 
leadership group emerging from the  independence movement nor a c t i v e  c i t i z e n  
groups who could help c r e a t e  a  democratic form of government. 
Even more t r a g i c  was the  development of c o n f l i c t  between t h e  two 
v i c t o r i o u s  a l l i e d  powers, t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  Soviet  Union, i n  
t h e  Korean Peninsula,  which u l t ima te ly  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of t h e  
country. I n  t h e  southern ha l f  of t h e  country a lone  a genera l  e l e c t i o n  
w a s  he ld  i n  1948 under t h e  supervis ion  of t h e  United Nations Temporary 
Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  f i r s t  National  Assembly. 
Subsequently, t h e  National  Assembly d ra f t ed  and approved t h e  na t ion ' s  
Cons t i tu t ion ,  and South Korea soon joined the  ranks of independent states, 
wi th  Syngman Rhee as her  f i r s t  p res ident .  The government c rea t ed  under 
t h e  new Const i tu t ion  was a  r epub l i c  i n  i t s  b a s i c  form, wi th  a cur ious  
mixture of both t h e  B r i t i s h  parl iamentary system and t h e  American pres- 
i d e n t i a l  system. Also, t h e  Cons t i tu t ion  f u l l y  guaranteed t h e  b a s i c  in- 
d iv idua l  r i g h t s  and l i b e r t i e s  which could be construed t o  be an e x p l i c i t  
a t tempt on t h e  p a r t  of p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a l i b e r a l  democracy. 
Despi te  t h e  ea rnes t  a s p i r a t i o n s  and hopes of those  who helped 
d r a f t  t h e  democratic and modern Cons t i tu t ion ,  t h e  new government quickly  
f e l l  prey t o  Rheels a u t o c r a t i c  ru le .  P o l i t i c a l  oppos i t ion  w a s  r u t h l e s s l y  
suppressed, destroying any chance t h e r e  was f o r  t h e  development of a 
v i a b l e  two- o r  mult i -party system. Overshadowed by t h e  predominance of 
t h e  Executive, t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  became inc reas ing ly  a  rubber stamp organ- 
i za t ion .  However, t h e  s tudent  upr i s ing  of 1960 brought down Rhee's regime 
and ushered i n  a new p o l i t i c a l  e r a  i n  t h e  country. The Democratic Party,  
an i n e f f e c t i v e  oppos i t ion  pa r ty  under Rhee's a u t o c r a t i c  r u l e ,  emerged now 
v i c t o r i o u s  i n  a  n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  and formed a new government. The 
Democratic pa r ty ' s  r u l e  (1960-61), s e r i o u s l y  ridden wi th  fac t ional i sm,  
proved to  be dismally impotent and was quickly overthrown by a junta  
i n  a successEul coup i n  May, 1961. Although t h e  period of the  Democratic 
Pa r ty ' s  r u l e  was b r i e f  and i t s  ine f fec t iveness  caused a c e r t a i n  amount 
of s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  d isorder ,  t h e r e  i s  no quest ion t h a t  i t  was t h e  
most l i b e r a l  and democratic period i n  the  na t ion ' s  postwar h is tory .  Like- 
wise, t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  became the  foca l  point  of p o l i t i c s  and exercised 
a g r e a t  dea l  of power a s  the  Const i tu t ion  prescribed. It w a s  now i n  t h e  
National Assmebly where key p o l i c i e s  were debated and decided, not  i n  
the  executive branch a s  i t  had been i n  t h e  pas t .  There w a s  even some 
r e a l  prospect of e s t ab l i sh ing  a parliamentary democracy f o r  t h e  f i r s t  
time i n  the  na t ion ' s  h is tory .  The successfu l  m i l i t a r y  coup, however, 
abruptly put an end t o  the b r i e f  but most l i b e r a l  period i n  Korea. 
The m i l i t a r y  junta  ru led  the  country f o r  two and a ha l f  years  
u n t i l  t h e  junta  l eade r s  decided t o  perpetuate t h e i r  con t ro l  by becoming 
p o l i t i c i a n s  themselves. They discarded t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  uniforms and com- 
peted i n  t h e  1963 na t iona l  e l e c t i o n  a s  the  members of a newly crea ted  
Democratic Republican Party. To no one's su rp r i se ,  t he  Democratic Repub- 
l i c a n s  won a majori ty and went on t o  form a government. The new regime, 
although no longer cont ro l led  d i r e c t l y  by t h e  junta,  w a s  s t i l l  a govern- 
ment by the  s o l d i e r s  i n  mufti .  Under t h i s  Democratic Republican regime 
the  Executive has gained such an enormous power and s t a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  
l e g i s l a t u r e  and the  judic iary  a r e  both reduced t o  t h e i r  subservient  ro l e s .  
Membership and Formal Powers 
During much of the  post-World War I1 period unicameralism has 
been the genera l  ru le .  An exception occurred during the  b r i e f  period 
of Chang ~ ~ % n ' s  government, 1960-61 when a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e  w a s  
created. The National Assembly consisted then of a lower House of Repre- 
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sen ta t ives  and an upper House of Councillors,  with the  membership of 
each house e lec ted  by d i f f e r e n t  e l e c t o r a l  procedures. The bicameral . 
l e g i s l a t u r e  was short- l ived,  however, due t o  the  m i l i t a r y  coup d ' e t a t - i n  May, 1961. 
Ever s ince ,  a unicameral l e g i s l a t u r e  has been i n  continued operat ion.  
Under t h e  yushin r u l e  ( the  October Revi ta l iz ing  Reforms) es tabl i shed 
i n  1972, a complicated e l e c t o r a l  system was adopted t o  s e l e c t  
l e g i s l a t i v e  members. Two-thirds of the  assemblymen were e lec ted  
d i r e c t l y  by voters  while the  remaining one-third were appointed by the  
President .  Medium s ized const i tuencies  were es tabl i shed by the  law, each 
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e lec t ing  two representa t ives .  The appointed yujonghoe ( the  P o l i t i c a l  
Society of Revi ta l iz ing  Reforms) members were nominated by t h e  President  
with t h e  concurrence of the  National Conference f o r  Unificat ion,  a 2,500 
membership body created t o  represent  "the c o l l e c t i v e  w i l l  of the  people 
t o  pursue peaceful un i f i ca t ion  of the  fatherland" but  i n  f a c t ,  no more 
than a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  device t o  give the  President  absolute  power. 
Because of t h i s  provision of appointed membership the  Pres ident ' s  con t ro l  
over the  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch was p r a c t i c a l l y  assured i n  advance. The 
appointed members served f o r  a term of th ree  years  i n  con t ras t  t o  a six- 
year term f o r  t h e  e l ec ted  members. 
The for tunes  of the  National Assembly have f luc tua ted  over the  
years. It was given a wide range of fonnal  powers a t  the  beginning but 
they were gradually taken away by t h e  executive. Since 1948 t h e r e  have 
been more than a half  dozen c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendments, each time r e s u l t i n g  
i n  reorganizat ion of l e g i s l a t i v e  powers. It should be noted t h a t  these  
amendments were not always st imulated by any inadequacy of the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
provis ions  but  by a l e s s e r  motive of s t rengthening the  personal  power of 
t h e  executive. Formal powers of t h e  National Assembly were d r a s t i c a l l y  
reduced i n  t h e  yushin Cons t i tu t ion  of 1972. The list of powers given 
t o  t h e  National Assembly included: d e l i b e r a t i o n  and enactment of l e g i s -  
l a t i v e  b i l l s ,  approval of n a t i o n a l  budget, t h e  power of concurrence i n  
t h e  dec la ra t ion  of war and t h e  d i spa tch  of t h e  army t o  fo re ign  coun t r i e s ,  
t h e  power t o  r a t i f y  t r e a t i e s  and agreements with f o r e i g n  coun t r i e s ,  and 
t h e  power t o  i n i t i a t e  impeachment proceedings a g a i n s t  t h e  P res iden t ,  t h e  
Prime Minister ,  t h e  cab ine t  members, and o the r  key government o f f i c i a l s .  
I n  comparison t o  previous Assemblies, t h e  yushin l e g i s l a t u r e  lacked 
s e v e r a l  c r u c i a l  powers t o  check executive dominance. One was t h e  abandon- 
ment of a previous provis ion  which empowered the  l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  make in- 
v e s t i g a t i o n s  of any governmental agencies.  Another w a s  t he  reduced budgetary 
power: a l though t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  could consider  t h e  budget submitted by 
t h e  executive,  i t  could not  i nc rease  t h e  sum o r  add a new item. Moreover, 
i f  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  f a i l e d  t o  approve it, t h e  executive could s t i l l  d i sbur se  
the  budget w i th in  a l i m i t .  What was more important i s i t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  
t hese  formal powers of t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  could e a s i l y  be circumvented by 
the  executive. The Pres ident  could completely f r e e z e  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
by invoking t h e  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  law, h i s  power f o r  emergency decrees ,  
o r  m a r t i a l  law. 
I n t e r n a l  Organization 
P r i n c i p a l  o f f i c e r s  of t h e  Assembly included t h e  Speaker, two Vice 
Speakers and t h e  Chairmen of t h e  13 Standing Committees. I n  r ecen t  years  
one of t h e  two Vice Speakers was usual ly  se l ec t ed  from among t h e  oppos i t ion  
members as a mat te r  of courtesy,  although it was no t  l e g a l l y  required.  
The rest of the  key o f f i c e s  were always cont ro l led  by the  government t 
. 
party.  The Committee Chairmen were e l ec ted  by a majori ty vote  i n  the  
6 
-. 
Assembly. The Committee system was organized c lose ly  i n  p a r a l l e l  t o  z 
t he  government m i n i s t r i e s ,  each committee wi th  i t s  couhterpart government 
agency. Leg i s l a t ive  b i l l s  proposed by individual  members o r  t h e  executive 
were f i r s t  debated i n  one of these  committees. In t h i s  respect ,  t h e  com- 
mi t tees  could play a p o t e n t i a l l y  decis ive  r o l e  i n  l e g i s l a t i o n .  However, 
t h e  executive exercised such a complete con t ro l  over the  phase of committee 
de l ibe ra t ions  t h a t  they were anything but an e f f e c t i v e  arena f o r  debate. 
I n  addi t ion ,  the re  were a l s o  the  Special  Committees appointed f o r  a l imi ted  
period and t o  deal  with s p e c i a l  matters.  
The Assembly was required t o  hold a regular  sess ion  once a year f o r  
no more than 90 days. Extraordinary sess ions  could be ca l l ed  by the  President  
o r  by one-third of a l l  representa t ives  f o r  no more than 30 days. The l i m i -  
t a t i o n s  imposed on the  length  of l e g i s l a t i v e  sessions represented a s ign i f -  
i can t  departure from the  previous prac t ices .  P r i o r  t o  the  promulgation of 
the  1972 yushin Const i tu t ion  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  could sit  i n  a regular  sess ion  
f o r  a s  many a s  120 days. The shortening of the  sess ion  was obviously aimed 
a t  weakening the  l e g i s l a t u r e .  
The National Assembly has the  a s s i s t ance  of a s i zeab le  l e g i s l a t i v e  
bureaucracy. The Assembly Sec re ta r i a t  employs well  over 1,000 s t a f f  and 
support personnel, a l l  carrying c i v i l  serv ice  ranks. The Secretary- 
General, an o f f i c e  equivalent  i n  rank t o  a cabinet  post ,  supervises a l l  
s t a f f  functions. One most important p a r t  of the  s t a f f  organizat ion c o n s i s t s  
of the  sen io r  counsel lors ,  a s o r t  of senior  s t a f f  members who a r e  assigned t o  
the standing committees and work a s  subject  matter s p e c i a l i s t s .  %The number 
of the  senior counsellors  is f ixed by the  law: 35. The National Assembly 
Library, an organ separa te  from the  Secre ta r i a t ,  a l s o  provides se rv ices  
necessary f o r  the rout ine  conduct of l e g i s l a t i v e  a f f a i r s .  The Library 
houses one of t h e ' l a r g e s t  co l l ec t ions  i n  the  nat ion and provides important 
l e g i s l a t i v e  reference services.  It employs severa l  hundred l i b r a r i a n s  
and w e l l  t ra ined researchers. 
THE DYNAMICS OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The l e g i s l a t i v e  process may be viewed a s  the  r e s u l t  of t h e  in te rp lay  
between formal l e g i s l a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  and the  p o l i t i c a l  cul ture .  The focus 
on the  process leads us t o  t h e  analys is  of what ac tua l ly  occurs i n s i d e  
and outs ide  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  r a t h e r  than how i t  should formally function. 
The l e g i s l a t i v e  process involves many d i f f e r e n t  ac tors :  l e g i s l a t i v e  
members, p a r t i e s  and fac t ions ,  t h e  executive, interest groups, and consti-  
tuents  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t .  The in te rac t ions  among these ac to r s  produce t h e  
dynamics of l e g i s l a t i v e  process. 
Legis la t ive  Members 
Korean l e g i s l a t o r s ,  l i k e  t h e i r  counterparts  i n  o ther  countr ies ,  
a r e  a highly s e l e c t  group i n  terms of t h d i r  background charac te r i s t i c s .  
They a r e  middle-aged, a l l  i n  t h e i r  f o r t i e s  and f i f t i e s ;  they a r e  a l l  w e l l  
educated with col lege  or ddvanced degrees i n  law, p o l i t i c a l  science o r  
mi l i t a ry  science; they held pres t ig ious  professional  occupations; and 
t h e i r  s o c i a l  o r ig ins  a r e  primari ly of the  middle and upper middle c lasses .  
In  t h i s  respect  they a r e  not  representa t ive  of the  population i n  society.  
I n  recent  years the  Assembly has been dominated by th ree  main groups: 
t h e  ex-military o f f i c e r s ,  t h e  ex-bureaucrats, and the  career  p o l i t i c i a n s .  
I n  t h e  wake of the  1961 m i l i t a r y  coup, a l a rge  number of t h e  ex-generals e 
a 
and high ranking o f f i c e r s  entered t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  It was both a r e f l e c t i o n  
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of the  increasing p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  of the  m i l i t a r y  a s  w e l l  a s  the  r e s u l t  of 8 
a d e l i b e r a t e  government s t r a t egy  of cooptation designed t o  e n l i s t  t h e  
support of the  m i l i t a r y  establishment. The percentage of t h e  ex-bureaucrats 
has increased over the  years ,  markedly more so s ince  the  yushin reforms. 
They represent  most pro-government elements i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  whose personal  
l o y a l t i e s  w e r e  t e s t ed  during t h e i r  previous se rv ice  i n  the  key adminis t ra t ive  
pos t s  o r  i n  t h e  Blue House. The career  p o l i t i c i a n s  a r e  found primari ly 
among t h e  opposi t ion members. Most of them s t a r t e d  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  ca ree r s  
w e l l  before t h e  m i l i t a r y  rose  t o  power and served a s  the  members of the  
opposi t ion even under Syngman Rheets regime. Because they entered p o l i t i c s  
e a r l y  in t h e i r  l i v e s ,  they had no o ther  occupational experience. 
With but  a few exceptions, t h e r e  a r e  genera l ly  no s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f ferences  between government and opposi t ion members. Opposition members 
tend t o  be s l i g h t l y  o lder  than t h e  government members. They a l s o  have 
aslonger p o l i t i c a l  experience than do most of the  government members. 
Except f o r  these  minor d i f fe rences  they form c o l l e c t i v e l y  a homogeneous 
group i n  t h e i r  s o c i a l  cha rac te r i s t i c s .  
The r e s u l t s  of survey s t u d i e s  show t h a t  most l e g i s l a t o r s  acquired 
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i t i c s  q u i t e  e a r l y  i n  t h e i r  l i v e s .  They grew up in 
fami l i e s  i n  which p o l i t i c s  had been a regular  subjec t  of discussions;  
they had severa l  of t h e i r  immediate family members a c t i v e l y  involved i n  
p o l i t i c s  who provided a r o l e  model during t h e i r  formative years;  they 
were themselves very a c t i v e  i n  ext ra-curr icular  a c t i v i t i e s ,  o f t e n  serving 
a s  the  o f f i c e r s  of s tudent  body organizat ions;  and they discussed p o l i t i c s  
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4 frequently with t h e i r  f r i ends  and schoolmates. The o r ig ins  of t h e i r  sub- 
m 
sequent career  development could therefore be traced back t o  t h e i r  ea r ly  
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and p o l i t i c i z e d  formative years. 
When they decided i n i t i a l l y  t o  seek a s e a t  i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  what 
were t h e i r  p r inc ipa l  motivations? The question of motivations, especia l ly  
those among p o l i t i c i a n s ,  is  a d i f f i c u l t  subject  t o  analyze. A s  a  rough 
measure w e  may d i s t ingu i sh  those drawn t o  p o l i t i c s  primari ly because of 
the  tangible  and in tangible  benef i t s  it confers and those who g e t  involved 
out  of a  s trong sense of c i v i c  duty o r  a  des i re  t o  serve the publ ic  i n t e r e s t .  
A predominant majority of Korean l e g i s l a t o r s  decided t o  seek t h e  o f f i c e  
because of the "extr insic" rewards such a s  pres t ige ,  power, and income. 
Only a small minority of no more than 10-20 percent chose a l e g i s l a t i v e  
career  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e i r  a l t r u i s t i c  motives. A l e g i s l a t i v e  career  c a r r i e s  
with it a highly instrumental value, productive of personal influence,  
s t a t u s ,  income, and pres t ige .  The high e x t r i n s i c  rewards associated with 
the l e g i s l a t u r e  a r e  r e a l l y  p a r t  of a  l a r g e r  phenomenon t h a t  we s h a l l  c a l l  
the "primacy of poli t ics , ' '  a  marked s t r u c t u r a l  f ea tu re  of Korean socie ty .  
P o l i t i c s  and government occupy such a c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  Korean s o c i a l  l i f e  
t h a t  they d i r e c t l y  intervene i n  the a l loca t ion  of a l l  s o c i a l  values such 
a s  pres t ige ,  s t a t u s ,  and wealth. To put  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  values and resources 
are s t r u c t u r a l l y  cumulative and the  epicenter  of t h i s  agglutinated s t r u c t u r e  
is the  government. Thus, successes i n  p o l i t i c s  and government a r e  the  
bes t  avenues t o  fame and for tune  i n  Korea. For t h i s  reason, the  most 
ambitious young people seek public careers,  not  so much because of t h e i r  
motivation t o  serve the  nation but  because of an excel lent  prospect f o r  
rapid s o c i a l  advancement. The primacy of p o l i t i c s  has many negative 
implicat ions,  including i ts  e f f e c t  on t h e  "high r i s k  system," t h e  subjec t  
which we have t r ea ted  extensively elsewhere. 1 I 
P o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and organized s o c i a l  groups play a r e l a t i v e l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  the  recrui tment process. For most l e g i s l a t o r s  
t h e i r  i n i t i a l  dec is ions  t o  seek the  o f f i c e  were e n t i r e l y  t h e i r  own and 
t h e i r  p a r t i e s  o r  groups with which they were associated,  played no impor- 
t a n t  ro le .  One study showed t h a t  w e l l  over 53 percent were "se l f -s tar tere ."  
Where p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and i n t e r e s t  groups are strong,  one would expect 
t o  f i n d  a smaller  proport ion of t h e  s e l f - s t a r t e r s  because successful  
p o l i t i c a l  ca ree r s  depend on t h e  a c t i v e  sponsorship of organizat ions.  
However, i t  appears t h a t  p a r t i e s  and organized s o c i a l  groups have no t  
y e t  matured enough i n  Korea t o  play such a r o l e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  recruitment. 
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It is a l s o  important t o  note the  phenomenon of yochon yado o r  the  
p e r s i s t e n t  tendency of the countryside supporting the government pa r ty  laxid 
the  c i t i e s  supporting t h e  opposition. A predominant majori ty of the  
government members were e l ec ted  from r u r a l  d i s t r i c t s  while most of t h e  
l e g i s l a t o r s  i n  opposi t ion represented l a r g e  urban d i s t r i c t s  l i k e  Seoul, 
Pusan, Taegu, and o ther  c i t i e s .  This d i s t i n c t i v e  p a t t e r n  of e l e c t o r a l  
support had gradually emerged under Rhee's a u t o c r a t i c  r u l e  and remained 
i n  the  ensuing years. The da ta  from t h e  7th National Assembly ind ica te ,  
f o r  example, t h a t  72 percent  of t h e  opposi t ion New Democrats, i n  comparison 
t o  only 14 percent of the  pro-government Democratic Republicans, represented 
urban d i s t r i c t s  i n  l a r g e  c i t i e s .  There a r e  good reasons f o r  such an elec- 
t o r a l  cleavage. Small group col lec t iv ism t h a t  s t i l l  p e r s i s t $  s t rongly  
i n  r u r a l  d i s t r i c t s  makes i t  easy f o r  the  government t o  mobilize r u r a l  
votes. In  l a r g e  urban cen te r s  where vo te r s  have a high l e v e l  of p o l i t i c a l  
consciousness and therefore a r e  d is i l lus ioned by the  repressive government 
po l ic ies ,  i t  i s  the  opposition candidates who of ten  benef i t  from pro tes t  
voting. Many urban voters  tended t o  support the  opposition members a s  an 
expression of t h e i r  displeasure with the  government i n  power, The y&chon 
yado phenomenon remains a d i s t i nc t i ve  aspect of l e g i s l a t i v e  recruitment. 
The cases of voluntary retirement from l e g i s l a t i v e  se rv ice  a r e  ex- 
tremely ra re .  Once elected o r  appointed to  a l e g i s l a t i v e  posi t ion,  everyone 
tries to  hold on t o  i t  with a ferocious tenacity.  The competition f o r  a 
renomination o r  reappointment has been in tense  indeed, providing both 
co lor fu l  and even sycophantic an t i c s  which enlivened the  otherwise d u l l  
l eg i s l a t i ve  l i f e .  Unless forced out by e l ec to r a l  defeats  o r  by f a i l u r e  t o  
obtain an appointment from the  President, a l l  t r i ed  to  r e t a i n  t h e i r  s e a t s  
a t  a l l  costs. 
Pa r t i e s  and Factions a 
A multi-party system has been i n  operation ever s ince  1948. I n  t he  
f i r s t  few years a f t e r  independence, a multitude of pa r t i e s ,  o f ten  poorly 
organized and most nothing more than a small group of personal entourage, 
appeared i n  the  Korean p o l i t i c a l  landscape. According t o  one estimation, 
there were some 350 such organizations. Gradually, a l l  these incipient  
pa r t i e s  disappeared or  were absorbed i n to  l a rge r  and be t t e r  organized par t i e s .  
With the  establishment of the Rhee regime party p o l i t i c s  evolved slowly i n to  
two more or  less cohesive groups, one i n  support of President Rhee's leader- 
ship and the other  opposed to  it. This marked the beginning of a loose two- 
party eystem and s e t  the pa t t e rn  f o r  party p o l i t i c s  i n  the  years t o  come. 
We spoke of a loose two-party system because there  have always been more 
than two major pa r t i e s  i n  the l eg i s la tu re .  Minor opposition pa r t i e s  and 
a small number of independents have added an element of f l u i d i t y  t o  th6  
bas ic  s t r u c t u r e  of a two-party system. 
I n  a more accura te  sense the  Korean par ty  system should be charac- 
t e r i zed ,  t o  use Scalapino's  term, a s  t h e  one-and-one-half par ty  system. 
No opposi t ion p a r t i e s  have ever a t t a ined  power through e l e c t i o n s  s o  f a r .  
In  more than a dozen e l e c t i o n s  held s ince  1948, the  government pa r ty  has 
not ye t  l o s t  a s i n g l e  e l e c t o r a l  contest .  The perennial  dominance of t h e  gov- 
ernment par ty  and t h e  l ack  of any r e a l i s t i c  opportunity f o r  opposi t ion 
p a r t i e s  t o  capture power a r e  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which def ine  the  Korean 
party system. 
I n  t h e  recent  yushin l e g i s l a t u r e  the  dominance of the  government 
was even g rea te r  than i n  some previous assemblies. With t h e  appointed 
members, one-third of the  t o t a l  membership, on t h e  government s ide ,  i t  
was r e l a t i v e l y  easy f o r  the Democratic Republican Par ty  t o  secure another 
one-third of the  t o t a l  s e a t s  i n  e lec t ion .  The government was comfortably 
in contro l  of a two-thirds majori ty i n  the  National Assembly, thanks t o  
i t s  con t ro l  over t h e  appointed membership. 
Factionalism is another well-known f e a t u r e  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  
It i s  much more v i r u l e n t  i n  opposi t ion p a r t i e s ,  of ten  f rac t iona l i z ing  them 
t o  the  point  of t o t a l  inef fec t iveness .  Fact ional  alignments within t h e  
opposition New Democratic Par ty  a r e  something of a legend. These fac t ions  
a r e  organized, i n  keeping with t h e  general  p o l i t i c a l  cu l tu re ,  on t h e  bases 
of personal  connections forged through family, school,  and regional  t i e s .  
Fact ional  s t r i f e  and r i v a l r y  tend t o  be in tense  and sometimes openly un- 
savory, which u l t imate ly  weakens the r o l e  of opposition p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  
l eg i s l a tu re .  
a A t  l e a s t  on t h e  su r face ,  t h e  government p a r t i e s  appeared t o  be f r e e  
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from t h e  d i v i s i v e  fac t ional i sm.  In  p a r t ,  t h i s  was because t h e  continued 
I 
t enure  of each government member depended almost e n t i r e l y  upon t h e  demon- 
s t r a t i o n  of h i s  o r  her  l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  President .  Given t h e  kind of person- 
a l i sm which p r e v a i l s  i n  t h e  organiza t ion  of power, i t  is no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  
deviant  f a c t i o n s  w e r e  no t  permitted i n  t h e  government p a r t i e s .  Any member 
who showed t h e  s l i g h t e s t  s i g n  of disagreement wi th  t h e  executive was promptly 
and severe ly  d i sc ip l ined  o r  removed from h i s  pos i t i on .  This does n o t ,  
however, mean t h a t  t he re  was no f a c t i o n a l  competition. In  t h e  government 
p a r t i e s ,  f ac t iona l i sm appeared i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  guise.  Because the  executive,  
who was a l s o  t h e  leader  of t h e  government p a r t i e s ,  con t ro l l ed  a  f u l l  a r r a y  
of rewards and punishments, t h e r e  was a  g r e a t  dea l  of r i v a l r y  among govern- 
ment members competing f o r  h i s  favors  and recogni t ion ,  Not only d id  t h i s  
p e r s o n a l i s t i c  power s t r u c t u r e  keep t h e  government members i n  l i n e ,  bu t  a l s o  
caused them t o  form a s o r t  of mutual a i d  s o c i e t y  t o  draw t h e  a t t e n t i o n  and 
favors  of t h e  President .  Thus, f a c t i o n a l  s t r i f e  was muted on t h e  su r face ,  
but  beneath i t  were i n t e n s e  f a c t i o n a l  r i v a l r i e s  f o r  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  
Pres ident .  
Lawmaking: The Executive Dominance 
Nowhere w a s  t he  executive dominance more evident  than i n  t h e  law- 
making process. A predominant major i ty  of t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b i l l s  were d r a f t e d  
and proposed f o r  cons idera t ion  by t h e  executive,  a l though l e g i s l a t i v e  members 
a l s o  had the  r i g h t  t o  do so. The number of h f l l s  submitted by tb execut ive  
is  only a  weak measure of t h e  executive dominance, however. A s t ronge r  
measure i s  t h e  r a t e  of success f o r  government b i l l s  i n  passing t h e  l e g i s -  
ture .  There is  evidence t o  show t h a t  t h e  government b i l l s  fa red  markedly 
b e t t e r  than d i d  the  p r i v a t e  members' b i l l s  i n  t h e  l a s t  30 years .  I n  one b 
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recent  s e s s ion  t h e  executive s e n t  nea r ly  four  hundred b i l l s  t o  t h e  Assembly 
and none of  t h e m  was defeated.  r 
Government b i l l s  were only pe r func to r i ly  debated, and amendments o r  
changes were seldom a t tached t o  them by the  National  Assembly. On numerous 
occasions i t  passed important b i l l s  such a s  the annual n a t i o n a l  budget 
without a  s i n g l e  debate on t h e  f l o o r  o r  only a f t e r  a  s u p e r f i c i a l  f i v e  o r  
s i x  minutes of debate.  The autonomy of t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch could be 
ind ica t ed  by the  ex ten t  t o  which i t  can r e j e c t ,  modify, o r  amend t h e  gov- 
ernment b i l l s .  Measured aga ins t  t h i s  s tandard,  t h e  Nat ional  Assembly was 
an impotent body, serv ing  merely a s  a rubber-stamp organiza t ion  i n  law-  
making. 
The absence of s i g n i f i c a n t  debate on t h e  f l o o r  could p r e s h a b l y  be 
compensated f o r  by t h e  debates  in va r ious  committees. But t h a t  has  not 
been t h e  case  i n  t h e  pas t .  The committees, designed t o  se rve  as the  main 
lawmaking a renas  s i n c e  t h e  1963 reorganiza t ion  of t h e  Assembly, were i n  
f a c t  completely dominated by government members including a l l  t h e i r  chair-  
manships. I n  consequence, t h e  e n t i r e  phase of committee d e l i b e r a t i o n  of 
a  b i l l  was sub jec t  t o  executive manipulation. 
Because of i t s  subserv ient  r o l e  t o  t h e  executive,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
o f t e n  became a n  ob jec t  of publ ic  r i d i c u l e .  One of t he  more humorous of t hese  
is  t h e  phrase "Kukhoe siny;hwan meaning t h a t  t h e  power of t h e  Assembly has 
s t e a d i l y  dec l ined  so  t h a t  i t  has become a maidservant of t h e  executive.  
This popular r i d i c u l e  conta ins  only p a r t  of t h e  t r u t h .  To say t h a t  t h e  r b  
power of t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  has s t e a d i l y  dec l ined ,  one must assume t h a t  t h e r e  
. D  
w a s  a time when i t  was r e a l l y  powerful. Except f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and t h e  short-  
l ived 5th Assemblies, i t  has always been a weak body. From the  beginning 
the  National Assembly had been dominated by the  executive. I f  t h i s  were the  
case, how could one conclude t h a t  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  l o s t  i t s  s t a t u r e  over time? 
The f a c t  of the  matter is  t h a t  i t  began a s  a weak body and remained so  
through much of i ts  his tory .  
The Informal Rules of the  Game 
This is  one subject  which has been l e a s t  studied. A s  a r e s u l t ,  our kno* 
ledge about t h i s  aspect of t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  process is very l imited.  We can 
o f f e r  here only a few impressionist ic  observations. The National Assembly, 
l i k e  any other p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  i s  c u l t u r a l l y  a microcosm of the  Korean 
socie ty  and therefore,  must r e f l e c t  a l l  the  t r a i t s  of the  Korean p o l i t i c a l  
cul ture .  The influence of formalism, especia l ly  its aspect of my&gbun, seems 
t o  be a f a c t o r  shaping p a r t  of the  informal ru les .  Because of t h e i r  excessive 
obsession with my&gbun they tend t o  be very loud i n  speech but  small i n  act ion.  
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This produces a r u l e  t h a t  a l e g i s l a t i v e  member should f i n d  a good myongbun be- 
fo re  he should take an act ion.  A corol lary  is t h a t  t h e  person with a b e t t e r  
myxngbun overrides o the rs  with l e s s e r  ones. There occurs, therefore,  a con- 
s t a n t  juggling of pos i t ions  in  search of a b e t t e r  mygngbun i n  order t o  upstage 
the  opponents. 
No clear-cut norms of pa r t i san  competition have yet  emerged i n  t h e  Assembly. 
Pa r t i san  c o n f l i c t s  have o f ten  gotten out  of hand, r e su l t ing  i n  v io len t  and 
unruly physical confrontat ions i n  t h e  Assembly H a l l .  F i s t  f igh t ing ,  shouting, 
and forced disrupt ion of an order ly  meeting have been frequent, especia l ly  
when tempers and emotions ran high on both s ides  of t h e  bench. The norms of 
of r ec ip roc i ty  and courtesy have not  been f irmly established.  Nor has t h e  
norm of subject  matter  spec ia l i za t ion  been developed t o  such an extent  t h a t  
members de fe r  t o  t h e i r  special is t-colleagues f o r  cues and advice. Every l eg i s -  
l a t o r  a c t s  a s  i f  he o r  she is  an expert  on a l l m a t t e r s .  
J Among the  government members of the  DRP and t h e  gujonghoe the r u l e  
I 
of i n v i o l a b i l i t y  of par ty  l i n e  was operat ive.  I n  t h i s  instance,  t h e  pa r ty  
l i n e  was tantamount t o  the  w i l l  of t h e  executive. Sanctions agains t  any c 
infringement of t h i s  r u l e  w e r e  prompt and severe. The r u l e  says: "NO 
matter  how you personally f e e l  about t h e  d i r e c t i v e  coming down from the  
par ty  President ,  never, never challenge it." I n  marked con t raa t ,  t h i s  
r u l e  does not  apply among opposi t ion members. The opposi t ion New Democratic 
Party is n e i t h e r  we l l  organized nor led  by an absolute  leader.  Fact ional  
bickering and seemingly perennial  s t rugg le  over t h e  par ty  leadership  make 
it d i f f i c u l t  t o  maintain a s trong d i s c i p l i n e .  
The r u l e s  of s e n i o r i t y  and apprenticeship,  the  two most well-known 
norms of the  U. S. Congress, a r e  prominently absent i n  t h e  National Assembly. 
I n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of the  committee chairmen a member's length of s e r v i c e  
i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  was t o t a l l y  i r r e l evan t .  The re levant  f a c t o r  was how 
much personal  t r u s t  he could e l i c i t  from the  executive head o r  h i s  c lose  
advisors. Likewise, the  apprenticeship r u l e  t h a t  requi res  new members t o  
r e s t r a i n  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  debates, t o  be r e spec t fu l  of t h e i r  senior  
colleagues, and t o  perform genera l ly  less a t t r a c t i v e  chores, i s  a l s o  absent.  
There e x i s t s  a  s trong pressure f o r  new members t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  pos i t ions  
a s  quickly a s  poss ib le  and one speedy way of doing t h i s  i s  t o  be outspoken. 
I f  done c lever ly ,  i t  was a l s o  one sure  way t o  g e t  quick a t t e n t i o n  from the  
supreme power holder. Among t h e  new members many were p o l i t i c i a n s  of the  
g r e a t e s t  prominence, having previously served a s  Prime Minister ,  cabinet  
members, o r  as d i r e c t o r  of a  powerful i n t e l l i g e n c e  agency. These prominent .i 
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  although new t o  the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  moved r i g h t  i n t o  the  key 
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l e g i s l a t i v e  pos i t ions .  
The National Assembly has a r e l a t i ve ly  shor t  and turbulent  h is tory .  
* Its operation has beeninterrupted several  times by unexpected regime changes. 
s Consequently, the  Assembly has not  yet  been firmly ins t i tu t iona l ized .  Nor 
has t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  had a long enough time and s t a b i l i t y  t o  c r y s t a l l i z e  
i ts  informal ru les  of the  game. 
P o l i t i c s  of Representation 
Representation, along with lawmaking, is one of the  two most c en t r a l  
functions t ha t  we a t t r i b u t e  t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  members. Whom do Korean legis-  
l a t o r s  t r y  t o  represent? How do they t r y  t o  represent  t h e i r  consti tuencies? 
And, what kind of things do they do on behalf of t h e i r  const i tuents ,  and how 
much? We seek t o  answer these  questions i n  order t o  provide a general  account 
of the  nature  of p o l i t i c a l  representation. 
A c lea r  majority of l e g i s l a t i v e  members believe t ha t  t h e i r  p r inc ipa l  
duty is  t o  represent the  co l l ec t ive  i n t e r e s t s  of the  nation a s  a whole. 
Although they were elected from geographic consti tuencies,  only a few per- 
ceived t h e i r  r o l e  a s  one of spokesman f o r  the  spec i f i c  i n t e r e s t s  of t he i r  
d i s t r i c t s .  The views and opinions held by t h e i r  d i s t r i c t  const i tuents  were 
not regarded a s  c ruc i a l  t o  t he i r  representat ive dut ies .  They ra ted t h e i r  
own pa r t i e s  a s  t he i r  pr incipal  focus of representat ion.  The same study a l s o  
indicates  tha t  over one-fourth did not  have any c lea r  notion about %hornu' 
they should be representing. T h i s  evidence suggests t ha t  Korean l eg i s l a t o r s  
do not  have i n  t he i r  minds spec i f i c  groups of people t o  whom they t a rge t  
t h e i r  act ions.  A l l  t h a t  they a r e  aware of ,  is  a vague e n t i t y  l i k e  the  
welfare of the  whole nation. I n  order to transform the  Assembly in to  a 
representat ive ins i tuhion more sens i t ive  t o  the  w i l l  of the  people a t  the  
grassroots,  l e g i s l a t i v e  members should acquire a conception of more spec i f i c  
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and concrete focus of representat ion,  such a s  t h e i r  voters  i n  the  d i s t r i c t ,  
* 
organized s o c i a l  groups, and s o  for th .  
Pecul iar  t o  the  yushin l e g i s l a t u r e  was the  existence of appointed 
members. One-third of the t o t a l  membership was appointed by t h e  executive, 
a l legedly  t o  ensure the  representa t ion of the  e n t i r e  na t iona l  cummunity. 
A s  one might e a s i l y  expect,  these  appointed members did not  f e e l  obliged 
t o  represent  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of any p a r t  of society.  I n  r e a l i t y ,  they acted 
a s  a d i r e c t  agent of the  executive. Together with these  appointed members 
who t o t a l l y  ignored the  representa t ion of any s p e c i f i c  segments of socie ty  
and t h e  e lec ted  members who were a l s o  insens i t ive  t o  such s p e c i f i c  i n t e r e s t s ,  
t h e  p s h i n  Assembly was anything but a s trongly representa t ive  body. 
The manner i n  which l e g i s l a t i v e  members t r y  t o  represent  t h e i r  groups 
is another important aspect  of representat ion.  Wahlke and Eulau have c a l l e d  
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it t h e  quest ion of representa t ional  s ty les .  They suggested th ree  ca tegor ies  
of such s ty les :  delegate,  t rus tee ,  and po l i t i co .  The delegate  s t y l e  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  cases i n  which l e g i s l a t i v e  members conceive of t h e i r  own job a s  t h e  
"errand boys," t h a t  is, they t r y  t o  r e f l e c t  the  views and opinions of t h e i r  
const i tuencies  a s  f a i t h f u l l y  a s  possible,  without permit t ing t h e i r  own personal  
views o r  convict ions t o  i n t e r f e r e .  The t r u s t e e  s t y l e  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  very 
opposite  inc l inat ions :  i n  t h i s  instance,  a l e g i s l a t i v e  member tries t o  
pursue h i s  own p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s  and convictions, ignoring the  sentiments 
of t h e  groups whom he is supposed t o  represent ,  The p o l i t i c o  s t y l e  repre- 
s e n t s  a hybrid type: a l e g i s l a t o r  v a c i l l a t e s  between the  two s t y l e s  of 
delegate and t r u s t e e  depending on t h e  circumstances. By f a r ,  t h e  delegate  
s t y l e  w a s  a dominant mode of representa t ion ahong Korean l e g i s l a t o r s .  One 
study revealed t h a t  three-quarters of the  7th Assemblymen defined t h e i r  
job a s  the  delegates .  The remainder chose t h e  t r u s t e e  s t y l e ,  w i th  no one 
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s e l e c t i n g  the p o l i t i c o  ro l e .  I n  view of the  Korean p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e ,  i t  
I is not  su rp r i s ing  t o  f i n d  a complete absence of the  p o l i t i c o  s t y l e .  A n  
aspect  of 'formalism r e q u i r e s  people t o  s t r e s s  a b s t r a c t  and genera l  p r inc ip l e s .  
People a r e  expected t o  l i v e  by p r i n c i p l e s ,  which i s  i n s i s t e d  upon even more 
s t rongly  among p o l i t i c a l  leaders .  The v a c i l l a t i n g  a t t i t u d e s  of a p o l i t i c o  
v i o l a t e  the  behavioral  codes of formalism. This  does not  mean t h a t  Korean 
l e g i s l a t o r s  do no t  v a c i l l a t e  i n  t h e i r  day-to-day deal ings.  They do. What 
w e  a r e  t ry ing  t o  suggest  here  is t h a t  on t h e  formal l e v e l ,  they do not  con- 
s i d e r  i t  appropr ia te  nor d e s i r a b l e  t o  a c t  i n  the  s t y l e  of a p o l i t i c o .  
I f  we look a t  the  s t y l e  and focus of r ep resen ta t ion  simultaneously 
a s  indica ted  by Korean l e g i s l a t i v e  members, we s e e  an as tonish ing  inconsis-  
tency i n  t h e i r  conceptions. On the  one hand, they saw t h e i r  r o l e  as one 
of represent ing  t h e i r  cons t i t uen t s '  opinions as f a i t h f u l l y  as poss ib le .  
Most chose the  de legate  s t y l e  of r ep resen ta t ion ,  On the  o ther  hand, they 
exhib i ted  no c l e a r  not ion  of "whom" they should be represent ing .  Many men- 
t ioned vaguely tha t  they should work f o r  t he  i n t e r e s t s  of t he  whole na t ion .  
Being a l a r g e  c o l l e c t i v i t y  composed of extremely d ive r se  elements and i n t e r e s t s ,  
a na t ion  is  no t  q u i t e  t h e  same e n t i t y  o r  as concre te  a s  a l abor  union o r  as 
a v i l l a g e  community-in the  d i s t r i c t .  This inconsis tency i n  percept ion 
implies  a low l e v e l  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of r ep resen ta t ive  system. A s  
an a b s t r a c t  p r i n c i p l e ,  almost a l l  Korean l e g i s l a t o r s  accept  the  premise 
of popular representa t ion .  However, i n  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  a c t i o n s  they do not  
show such commitments. When they a r e  not  q u i t e  su re  themselves of which 
groups they should r ep resen t ,  how can they a c t  i n  a responsive and repre- 
s e n t a t i v e  manner? Their professed commitment t o  the  democratic p r i n c i p l e  
of popular representa t ion  s t i l l  remains more of an i d e a l  than a  r e a l i t y .  
I n  pursuance of t h e i r  r ep resen ta t ive  duty, l e g i s l a t i v e  members a r e  
a l s o  expected t o  perform const i tuency se rv ices .  Broadly speaking, cons t i tu-  
ency s e r v i c e  encompasses a  wide range of a s s i s t a n c e  t h a t  a l e g i s l a t o r  provides 
f o r  ind iv idua l s  o r  groups i n  h i s  d i s t r i c t .  He may bring "pork ba r re l "  p r o j e c t s  
t o  h i s  home d i s t r i c t ,  may help g e t  government funds t o  cons t ruc t  roads, 
school bui ldings,  o r  o ther  publ ic  f a c i l i t i e s .  On a  more personal l e v e l ,  
he may f i n d  a  job f o r  h i s  cons t iuent ,  in tercede  with a government agency 
when h i s  cons t i tuen t  has problems with i t ,  o r  g ive  an i n s p i r i n g  speech a t  
a school commencement. How important do they regard such a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
how f requent ly  do they engage i n  these  a c t i v i t i e s ?  Many l e g i s l a t i v e  members, 
wel l  over one-half of a l l  interviewed i n  a  r ecen t  study, regarded such 
a c t i v i t i e s  a s  not  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e i r  job. Ins tead ,  they considered o t h e r  
a c t i v i t i e s  f a r  more important,  such a s  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  l e g i s l a t i v e  
debates. It is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  note t h a t  the  cons t i tuen t s  a l s o  d id  not  s t r e s s  
the  importance of const i tuency serv ices .  Although i t  does not appear t h a t  
l e g i s l a t o r s  render  a g rea t  dea l  of se rv ices ,  they do seem t o  t ake  se r ious ly  
the  r eques t s  coming from l o c a l  notables  (w) i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  Because 
these  l o c a l  notables  c o n t r o l  e l e c t o r a l  votes  i n  t h e i r  r e spec t ive  communities, 
the  l e g i s l a t o r s  t r y  hard t o  c u l t i v a t e  t h e i r  good w i l l  and f r iendship .  There 
is a  marked d i f f e rence  between urban and r u r a l  l e g i s l a t o r s .  Those who 
represented l a r g e  urban d i s t r i c t s  showed a  s t rong d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  engage 
i n  const i tuency serv ices .  By comparison, the  r u r a l  l e g i s l a t o r s  were f a r  
more eager t o  render such serv ices .  This suggests  t h a t  const i tuency se rv ice  
is a s i g n i f i c a n t  aspect  of a  l e g i s l a t o r ' s  job i f  he were e l ec ted  from a 
r u r a l  d i s t r i c t .  There is a l s o  evidence t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  more r u r a l  one 's  
d i s t r i c t ,  t h e  more s a l i e n t  is h i s  s e r v i c e  work. The a v a i l a b l e  evidence 
4 f a i l s  t o  show any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  government and op- 
p o s i t i o n  members both i n  t h e  type and amount of s e r v i c e s  rendered,  
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The National  Assembly i n  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  System 
The l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  t h e  most important l inkage  i n s t i t u t i o n .  A s t rong  
and e f f e c t i v e  l e g i s l a t u r e  is c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  opera t ion  of a democratic 
po l i t y .  Such a  l e g i s l a t u r e  he lps  expand p a r t i c i p a t o r y  oppor tuni ty ,  per- 
mi t t i ng  broader segments of s o c i e t y  t o  have t h e i r  vo ices  heard i n  govern- 
mental dec is ions .  It can a l s o  he lp  l e g i t i m a t e  t h e  government's p o l i c i e s  
and a u t h o r i t i e s ,  con t r ibu t ing  t o  the system's s t a b i l i t y .  
The Nat iona l  Assembly played a  modest r o l e  i n  t h e  expansion of c i t -  
i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Had there been no l e g i s l a t u r e ,  t h e  Korean People would 
have t h a t  much less p a r t i c i p a t i o n  normally assoc ia ted  wi th  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
body. To begin with,  t h e  ex i s t ence  of a  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  even i f  it was a  very  
weak i n s t i t u t i o n ,  c r ea t ed  an e l e c t o r a l  opportuni ty every four  o r  six years .  
Although e l e c t o r a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  may no t  amount t o  much when one cons iders  
i t s  mobilized cha rac t e r ,  it  is,  however, j u s t  about t h e  only  opportuni ty of 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  people. More important ly,  l e g i s l a t i v e  members 
help s t imu la t e  o the r  forms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  To many c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  l e g i s -  
l a t o r s  appear more f r i e n d l y  and approachable than those  aloof and conde- 
scending government o f f i c i a l s .  When c o n s t i t u e n t s  have a  problem they would 
f e e l  easy t o  take  i t  t o  t h e i r  r ep re sen ta t ive  and seek  h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h e i r  
e f f o r t  t o  inf luence  government ac t ion .  There a r e  o the r  forms of pa r t i c ipa tkon  
s t imula ted  merely because an e l ec t ed  r ep re sen ta t ive  is around. A l l  these  
forms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  would n o t  have been poss ib l e  i f  t he  l e g i s l a t u r e  had 
n o t  ex is ted .  U n t i l  now, t h e  propor t ion  of c i t i z e n s  a c t u a l l y  lobbying t h e i r  
r ep resen ta t ives  has  been extremely small: no more than  4-5 percent  of t h e  
a d u l t  population. However, a s  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  ga ins  i t s  s t r e n g t h  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  i t  w i l l  provide oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  more a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by the  
c i t i z e n s .  
The r e s i l i e n c e  of a  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a  w e l l  documented 
subjec t .  Even i n  most d i c t a t o r i a l  regimes t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  l e g i s l a t u r e .  
In  many Third World coun t r i e s  l e g i s l a t u r e s  w e r e  f r equen t ly  disbanded during 
c r i s e s ,  but  these  bodies  were a l s o  promptly r e su r rec t ed  a f t e r  the  c r i s e s  
subsided. The ques t ion  is then: why do these  d i c t a t o r i a l  regimes not  do 
away t o t a l l y  wi th  t h i s  cumbersome i n s t i t u t i o n ?  The answer is  t h a t  t he  
l e g i s l a t u r e  he lps  enhance t h e  regime's  legi t imacy.  The s u r v i v a l  of t h e  
Korean National  Assembly through s e v e r a l  not-so-democratic regimes is a l s o  
a  testimony t o  t h e  above observat ion.  
Although the  National  Assembly has no t  been a  s t rong and e f f e c t i v e  
body, i t  has a t t r a c t e d  a  f a i r  amount of pub l i c  a t t e n t i o n .  Of course, it 
is  by no means a s  prominent a s  t h e  execut ive  i n  t h e  people 's  cogn i t ive  
map. But i t  does command some a t t e n t i o n  and v i s i b i l i t y  among t h e  publ ic .  
Our s tudy shows t h a t  some 40 percent  of t h e  a d u l t  c i t i z e n s  had a  reasonably 
accura t e  knowledge of t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  membership. And, 60 percent  were 
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a b l e  t o  name a t  l e a s t  one of t h e i r  l e g i s l a t o r s .  The pub l i c  awareness of 
t he  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  i f  no t  remarkably impressive, is  stil l  con- 
s iderable .  The Korean people know what the  l e g i s l a t u r e  is, what i t  is  
supposed t o  do, and how w e l l  o r  poorly i t  i s  doing i t s  job. This pub l i c  
awareness was another  f a c t o r  which had prevented t h e  l eade r s  of t h e  p a s t  
regimes from abol i sh ing  it. 
Despite  the  f a c t  t h a t  t he  National Assembly has not performed 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ,  t he  Korean publ ic  s t i l l  regard i t  a s  an important and worth- 
..) while i n s t i t u t i o n  which deserves maintaining. There appears t o  be consid- 
L 
e rab le  publ ic  support f o r  the l e g i s l a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n .  This  support is  
not  based so much on t h e  accomplishments o r  performance of the  National 
Assembly. Rather, i t  stems from t h e i r  hope and a s p i r a t i o n  f o r  a democratic f u t u r e  
i n  which t h e  Assembly would perform i ts  presumed ro le .  Many c i t i z e n s  rec- 
ognize t h e  important r o l e  of t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  the  democratic process. 
Also, they r e a l i z e  t h a t  an a c t i v e  and s t rong l e g i s l a t i v e  body is  c r u c i a l  
t o  t h e  establishment of a democratic po l i ty .  For t h i s  reason, they accord 
the  Assembly t h e i r  support.  
A l l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  r equ i re  a minimal l e v e l  of publ ic  support f o r  t h e i r  
continued existence.  Viewed from t h i s  perspect ive,  the  Korean National 
Assembly has met a t  l e a s t  one v i t a l  condit ion f o r  i ts  surviva l ,  namely a 
degree of publ ic  support. To be a b i t  more p rec i se ,  how much publ ic  support 
is  the re  f o r  t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n ?  Our study shows t h a t  over one-half of t h e  
adu l t  c i t i z e n s  expressed t h e i r  unreserved support f o r  i t ,  suggesting t h a t  
the  National Assembly i s  worth keeping. Others thought i t  u t t e r l y  use less ,  
given what l i t t l e  i t  did,  o r  w e r e  unable t o  sharply d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  l eg i s -  
l a t u r e  from o the r  p a r t s  of the government. The National Assembly w i l l ,  i t  
seems c l e a r ,  expand its base of publ ic  support a s  i t  matures i n t o  a s t ronger  
and more e f f e c t i v e  body. 
We have s t r e s s e d  the  in t imate  connection between the  l e g i s l a t i v e  
i n s t i t u t i o n  and the  funct ioning of a democracy. I f  one assumes t h a t  a 
genuine democracy is  what both the  l eade r s  and the  people i n  Korea want, 
one of the f i r s t  s t e p s  t o  take  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n  is  t o  c r e a t e  a 
s trong and a c t i v e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  The na t ion ' s  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  should be 
organized around the legislature because there is no other linkage insti- 
tution more vital than the representative body. It is important to 
strengthen the Assembly by constitutional and other structural reforms. 
But the task of building a democratic and strong legislature goes much deeper 
than mere legal and institutional tinkering. The legislature is deeply 
embedded in the nation's political culture. Thus, its operation is invar- 
iably affected by the political cultural tendencies. Without support 
of a cultural infrastructure, i.e., the participant political culture, 
the National Assembly is not likely to mature into a stronger body. The 
Korean political culture still contains many elements inimical to the suc- 
cessful operation of a democratic process. Small group consciousness, for- 
malism, authoritarian attitudes, personalism, oppositional syndrome, and 
political emotionalism are all the kind of cultural elements distinctly 
hostile to the creation of a democratic process. These cultural tendencies 
need to be changed through citizen education and by farsighted policies 
designed to foster values and beliefs appropriate for a democratic citizen. 
It is a task even more difficult than achieving economic growth. It also 
requires a political leadership with foresight and commitment to the ideals 
of democracy. The road to democracy is tortuous, indeed. In the last 
decade Koreans have succeeded in transforming their country of poverty 
into one of relative affluence. Now, they face another undertaking, a 
challenge even greater than their economic achievements. 
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